


JPRS-TND-91-020
13 DECEMBER 1991



JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-91-020

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13 December 1991

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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SOUTH AFRICA

Arms-Related Deals With U.S., Europe Detailed

MB2211143491 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
in English 22-28 Nov 91 p 9

[Report by Gavin Evans: "Front companies used for illicit arms deals"]

[Text] Further documentary evidence of South Africa's arms-related deals with the United States, Argentina and several European countries has been received by THE WEEKLY MAIL.

The documents, which all cover the period between 1984 and 1986, throw further light on the nature of the secret contracts, which involved the transfer of weapons, planes, technology and chemicals for the arms industry.

As with the state documents previously exposed by THE WEEKLY MAIL, these indicate that many of the deals involved the use of private companies as importers, and of an apparently fictitious Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] front company "Nimrod International" as the main exporter. According to MacGregor's On-Line Information, publishers of MacGregor's Who Owns Whom, there is no record of Nimrod's existence.

An example of an export detailed in the latest documents is "STC Two Cases Cartridges", weighing 1,660kg and with an export value of R[and]62,438 to Argentina, via San Juan, on a ship from San Juan, Puerto Rico, on February 21 1985. The document is marked "Defence" and the export company is Nimrod International.

Other documents showed exports of military-related equipment to Chile and France.

Imports included the following:

- "Aircraft spare parts", weighing 29.8kg from Ofema, of Paris, France on December 11 1984. The importing company is listed as Olsino Services of Pretoria, and the document is signed by C. Millard and J. Nell of Armscor. The price is listed as R21,862.
- "Aircraft parts—other", weighing 5kg, from Provest, Varese, Italy in on March 12 1985. It was imported by Armscor's Atlas Aircraft Corporation and signed by J.J. van der Westhuizen of Atlas.
- 504 pump action, single barrel shotguns of a calibre exceeding 10.67mm, from an unlisted Italian company on November 23 1984. The customs value is listed as R110,331. The guns arrived in Bloemfontein and were transferred from the warehouse of the Armscor subsidiary Musgrave Manufacturers and Distributors in Boemfontein to the Armscor warehouse in Pretoria, and the document is signed by JF Liebenberg of Armscor.
- 492 pump action, single barrel shotguns from the same Italian source on April 1 1985. The customs value is listed as R129,972.
- 13kg of Microfiche from Information Handling SVC, of Colorado, USA on March 20 1985 and 14.5kg of "microfilm, being film for optical projection ..." on July 7 1984. In both cases the importer is listed as the Armaments Board, Pretoria.
- 965kg of specialised electric cable from Habia Fercale, Barcelona, Spain on April 4 1984. It was imported by Electro Cables and Mining of Sandton, for the Department of Defence. Its customs value is R4,559.
- "Spares for sand-blasting unit" from CWP Industries, Basing, USA on April 4 1984. It was imported for Armscor by Dart Communications, of Alberton.
- 300kg Lanthanum Oxide from Auer-Remy, Hamburg, Germany on November 20 1984. It was imported by the Eloptro plant of the Armscor subsidiary Kentron, and its customs value is listed as R7,984.
- 7.7kg of "Other Tungsten Metal Powder" from Herman C Stark, Berlin, Germany on September 17 1984. It was imported by the Armscor subsidiary Swartklop Products (Pty) Ltd.
- 3,000kg of Barium Nitrate from Barium and Chemicals Inc, Ohio, USA on March 16 1984. It was imported by the Armscor subsidiary Swartklip Products and signed by Armscor official J.C. Heunis. Its customs value is listed as R10,085.
- 315kg of "Other sulphides [as published] being Antimony Trisulphide" from Bleiberger Bergwerke Union, Austria on March 17 1985. It was imported for Armscor and its subsidiary Pretoria Metal Pressings, by Delta G Scientific, Boksburg and its customs value is listed as R4,148.
- 8,547,63kg of "Nicylic Polymer stref" from a chemical company in Hamburg, Germany whose name can't be deciphered from the document, on October 2 1985. It was imported by RSM Chemicals, Pretoria for Armscor's Rocket and Missile fuel plant, Somchem.
- 1,000kg of Isophorone Diisocyanate from Huls of Germany on May 4 1984. It was imported by Apecochem of New Germany for Armscor's Rocket and Missile plant, Somchem.
- 544kg of Cellulose Acetate from Eastman Chemical International, Switzerland on May 27 1984. It was imported by Holpro Analytics, Johannesburg for Somchem with a customs value of R1,954.
- 100kg of Peroxide of Strontium from Bernardy Chemie of Vierton, France on March 15 1984. It was imported for Armscor by Swartklip Products.

IAEA Begins Investigation of Nuclear Facilities

*MB1911153391 Johannesburg South African
Broadcasting Corporation Network in English
1100 GMT 19 Nov 91*

[Text] An International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] team has begun an investigation of all the nuclear

material and nuclear industry facilities in this country to make sure they are being used for peaceful purposes.

The visit follows the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by South Africa in June last year.

South Africa has already supplied an inventory of nuclear material and facilities to the agency.

Foreign Ministry Official Missile Control, Korea
HK2111133791 Beijing ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE
in Chinese 1040 GMT 21 Nov 91

[Excerpts] Beijing, 21 Nov (ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE)—Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin said today that China intends to abide by the standards and interpretations of the Missile Technology Control Regime when making technological transfers, on the condition that the United States lift the three sanctions it placed on China on 16 June 1991.

Wu Jianmin said, in reply to a reporter's question at the news briefing, that China always keeps its word. (passage omitted)

The Chinese and Americans also discussed the situation on the Korean peninsula. Wu Jianmin said the Chinese side has shown consistent concern for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and supports all views and actions which may help turn the peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. The Chinese side stated that China is willing to work with all concerned parties to bring a solution to this problem. The United States stated the same wish.

Spokesman Denies Export of Reactor to Syria
CM2911132391 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO OVERSEAS
EDITION in Chinese 29 Nov 91 pl

["PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Says China Has Not Exported Any Nuclear Reactor to Syria"]

[Text] Beijing, November 28 (XINHUA)—China has not exported any nuclear reactor to Syria, said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin at a weekly press conference here this afternoon.

In response to a question on whether Syria has purchased a nuclear reactor from China, the spokesman said the fact is that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) intends to purchase from China a miniature neutron source reactor with the power of 30 kilowatt, used for neutron activation analysis and isotope production.

The IAEA will provide Syria with this nuclear reactor for its use as an item of the agency's technical assistance, according to the spokesman.

He said the safeguard agreement concerning this reactor is yet to be ratified by IAEA's board of directors.

NORTH KOREA

Envoy Briefs Media on Nuclear Inspection

SK2611154891 Beijing Radio Beijing in Korean
1100 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] Chu Chang-chun, DPRK ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to China, held a news conference in Beijing today. In it, he clarified North Korea's consistent position on nuclear inspection.

Ambassador Chu Chang-chun said: If the United States really wants to prevent nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula, it should abandon its pressure on North Korea. As proposed by North Korea, the United States also should withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea as well as remove the nuclear threat against the North. All it has to do is to agree to verify the absence of nuclear weapons through a simultaneous nuclear inspection of the North and South.

As for the South Korean Government's denuclearization plan declared early in November, Ambassador Chu Chang-chun said: The South Korean Government, which had desperately opposed the very word denuclearization, has accepted part of our side's standing proposal for a nuclear-free zone, thus declaring that it will formally allow denuclearization. This is notable.

Ambassador Chu Chang-chun continued: The South Korean Government, in its recent declaration, did not mention even a word about the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons, which is blocking the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. It is unrealistic to talk about denuclearization without solving basic problems.

SOUTH KOREA

'Appropriate Action' Promised on Nuclear Plans

SK3011025091 Seoul YONHAP in English 0239 GMT
30 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 30 (YONHAP)—South Korea will take "appropriate action" in the nearest future to follow up on nuclear initiatives announced by U.S. President George Bush and South Korean President No Tae-u, Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok said Saturday.

Seoul and Washington were discussing details of the U.S. and Korean initiatives, and it was difficult to say when the nuclear withdrawal from Korea would be completed, Yi told a news conference.

"At an appropriate time in the nearest future, we will be able to take an action," he said, suggesting the U.S. nuclear pullout will be carried out at a fast pace.

"We will consider declaring non-presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea at an appropriate time as well," Yi said.

Seoul and Washington are holding consultations on overall securities arrangements on the Korean peninsula, and the matter was discussed at the 23rd Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting here earlier this month, the foreign minister said.

North Korea is unpredictable and it is uncertain whether it will sign a nuclear safeguards accord by next February, when the directors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are to meet.

"We believe that given the overall political development, North Korea will have to change its policy. We will be carefully watching North Korea's reaction at the IAEA governors' meeting Dec. 5-6, and inter-Korean prime ministers' talks," Yi said.

Next week's IAEA meeting would be too short to discuss North Korea's nuclear development but the topic might be raised when the meeting addressed nuclear inspection in Brazil and Argentina, Yi told the press conference.

He refused to link the inter-Korean prime ministers' talks with North Korea's nuclear program.

"We must simultaneously pursue effective progress in inter-Korean dialogue and deterrence of North Korea's nuclear arms development. Forestalling dialogue over nuclear controversy is not an effective method," Yi said.

"South Korea does plan to demand at the fifth inter-Korean prime ministers' talks next month that North Korea receive immediate inspection of its nuclear facilities," he said.

The foreign minister denied that either Seoul or Washington was considering military action to stop North Korea's nuclear arms program.

"Suggestions of military alternatives were not made by U.S. policymakers, and we are not considering it either. We are opting for all available diplomatic and political solutions," he said.

No Tae-u To Verify Nuclear Pullout by January

SK2111033291 Seoul YONHAP in English 0232 GMT
21 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 21 (YONHAP)—President No Tae-u is likely to declare that South Korea is free of nuclear arms when U.S. President George Bush visits Seoul Jan. 5-7, a government source said Thursday.

Nuclear weapons deployed in Korea by the U.S. forces would be pulled out within the year before "international diplomatic efforts go into full swing to force North Korea to stop nuclear arms development," the source said, asking not to be identified by name or title.

No may make the declaration in a joint news conference to wind up Bush's two-day visit.

The two allies have a policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear warheads in South Korea, but it is generally believed that the United States has nuclear arms in Korea.

Bush's planned visit to Seoul was the last in a series of steps designed to get North Korea to stop developing nuclear arms before launching all-out international efforts in the diplomatic front, the source said.

If North Korea refuses to scrap its nuclear reprocessing facilities even after No officially states that there are no nuclear weapons in the South, forcible means may be used by the U.N. Security Council and other international organizations, he said.

The governors' meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in February will serve as a forum for deciding how to apply sanctions to North Korea, the source said.

Foreign minister Yi Sang-ok said Wednesday that Seoul could announce the absence of nuclear arms "in the not distant future" if Bush's Sept. 27 promise of nuclear reduction was carried out as planned.

In his Nov. 8 declaration of "non-nuclear Korean peninsula peace initiatives," No said South Korea "will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons" or nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities.

North Korea is believed to be nearly or already capable of producing an atomic bomb. The hard-line communist government joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] in 1985 but has not yet signed a nuclear safeguards accord with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] as an NPT signatory is required to do within 18 months of joining.

EC Welcomes No Tae-u's Non-Nuclear Declaration

SK2111032591 Seoul YONHAP in English 0147 GMT 21 Nov 91

[Text] Brussels, Nov. 20 (YONHAP)—The European Community (EC) Wednesday welcomed South Korean President No Tae-u's recent non-nuclear Korean peninsula peace initiatives and urged North Korea to sign and implement safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) without further delay and preconditions.

"President No's statement provides an important reaffirmation that South Korea will stand by its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty." The EC said in a statement.

The statement said No's Nov. 8 declaration represented important confidence building measures on the Korean peninsula and called on North Korea to respond positively to No's declaration.

Agreement With Japan To Expand Cooperation

SK1511063291 Seoul YONHAP in English 0618 GMT 15 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 15 (YONHAP)—South Korea and Japan have agreed to press North Korea through diplomatic channels to sign a full-scope nuclear safeguards accord at the earliest date and to expand cooperation in the field of atomic energy.

The accord came in a meeting of the joint atomic consultation committee in Tokyo on Wednesday and Thursday, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said Friday.

Noting that atomic energy is a crucial source of electricity in both nations, they agreed to intensify cooperation to ensure security, confidence and economical efficiency in the pursuit of atomic energy power generation.

Yi Chong-mu, director-general of the Korean Foreign Ministry's International Economic Affairs Bureau, headed the Korean side and Hiroshi Ohta, deputy director-general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Science and Technology Bureau, was his opposite number on the committee.

North Said Aiding Third World Nuclear Programs

SK0312051391 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network in Korean 1200 GMT 2 Dec 91

[By correspondent Yi Pyong-sun from Berlin; recorded]

[Text] (Konrad Potsner), head of the German federal information agency, in an interview with the German daily DIE WELT said today that North Korea's standard of nuclear weapons technology is such that it is now capable of increasing the range of Scud missiles, exceeding the range of the Scud missiles exported to the Middle East. (Konrad Potsner) revealed that North Korea not only has already built a Scud missile manufacturing plant in Syria but also is assisting Middle East countries with the technology to increase the range of Scud missiles.

(Konrad Potsner) said that North Korea is leading the technological cooperation with Third World countries for the development of rockets based on its technology of developing nuclear weapons, maintaining close cooperative relations with these countries. Therefore, if this cooperative system for the development of nuclear weapons continues, with North Korea playing the key role in it, a considerable number of Third World countries will possess nuclear and biochemical weapons within ten years, (Potsner) added.

North Said To Have New Nuclear Research Reactor

SK2511130591 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean 25 Nov 91 p 1

[Text] In addition to Yongbyon, North Korea has installed a 50-megawatt nuclear research reactor in

Sinpo, South Hamgyong Province, and is operating it. On 25 November, a source well informed on North Korea revealed that North Korea is building a large tunnel around the nuclear research centers in Yongbyon and Sinpo.

Sinpo is an important military area where the North Korean submarine base is located. The fact that North Korea was installing a nuclear research reactor in Sinpo was already known. However, this is the first time that a nuclear research reactor is known to be operating.

The source revealed that the nuclear research reactor in Sinpo has been confirmed as made in Germany.

The Soviet Union was originally expected to provide North Korea with a nuclear research reactor. According to the North Korean-Soviet construction treaty signed in 1985, the Soviets finished surveying conditions of the location and began to help North Korea with construction. When the CPSU was crushed, Soviet relations with North Korea cooled and Soviet aid has been suspended.

In particular, the source analyzed that a large tunnel around the nuclear research centers of Yongbyon and Sinpo seems to hide major equipment, including nuclear materials, and to be part of preparations against an external attack.

Meanwhile, a high-ranking government official said that the two nuclear reactors in North Korea can produce three to five small nuclear bombs every year beginning in 1993. He also predicted that a nuclear reprocessing plant, a plant for processing nuclear materials, and a bomb test area will be completed in 1994 or 1995.

The high-ranking official predicted that the development of nuclear weapons in the closed society of North Korea could be more rapid than our analysis shows, considering that the United Nations' nuclear inspection of Iraq revealed a higher level of Iraqi nuclear development than the West had judged.

North To Sign 'Safeguards' Accord in February

*SK2211074291 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
22 Nov 91 p 1*

[Text] It was learned on 22 November that in order to stop the increasing pressure to accept international nuclear inspection, North Korea will sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord before the February 1992 regular directors' meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

A high-ranking government official revealed: "North Korea does not want its nuclear issue to move to the United Nations. We received information from the United States and China that North Korea had already decided internally to sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord."

This official said that through the directors' meeting in December and February of next year the IAEA plans to

draw up a measure forcing North Korea to receive nuclear inspection and will take this matter to the UN Security Council. This official added: "Therefore, North Korea will sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord before the February regular directors' meeting."

This official stated: "It is predicted that even though North Korea signs the Nuclear Safeguards Accord its effective date will be delayed on the grounds that domestic ratification procedures must be taken. The ROK Government will not lessen its diplomatic pressure against North Korea even if it does sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord. It will continue to pressure North Korea to receive nuclear inspection and abolish all nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities which are the source of developing nuclear weapons."

Chon In-chol, vice minister of the DPRK Foreign Ministry and head of the North Korean delegate to the DPRK-Japan talks to normalize diplomatic relations, and Choe U-Chin, ambassador-at-large of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, who is in the United States now, recently strongly hinted that North Korea is willing to sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord.

Message Cites North's Conditions for Inspection

*SK2211120091 Seoul YONHAP in English 1144 GMT
22 Nov 91*

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 22 (OANA-YONHAP)—North Korea has sent a message to South Korea and the United States that it is prepared to accept international inspection of its nuclear facilities on condition that the two Koreas accept simultaneous inspection of nuclear weapons sites, South Korean Ambassador to the United States Hyon Hong-chu said Friday.

Whether this suggests North Korea is ready to open its nuclear facilities to outside inspection remains to be seen, Hyon said, but the overall reaction in Washington about the message is that it does not contain anything new.

The message was delivered through William Taylor, vice president for international security programs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who was in Pyongyang earlier this month, according to Hyon.

It was addressed to U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, South Korean Defense Minister Yi Chong-ku and Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok and U.S. Ambassador to Korea Donald Gregg, Hyon said.

Hyon briefly returned to Seoul to attend the 23rd South Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting that ended Thursday.

The message was that North Korea is prepared to receive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections as soon as South Korea and the United States are prepared to receive inspection of "nuclear weapons sites" in the South.

Foreign Ministry officials here claimed the message does not suggest the North is about to accept nuclear inspection but is insisting on "verifying" that U.S. tactical weapons have indeed been withdrawn from the South as U.S. President George Bush announced in September.

North's Terms for Nuclear Inspections Rejected

SK2311062991 Seoul YONHAP in English 0611 GMT 23 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 23 (YONHAP)—South Korea is willing to hold arms reduction talks with North Korea and allow inter-Korean inspections of nuclear facilities on condition the North agrees to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, a senior government official said Saturday.

President No Tae-u declared a non-nuclear Korea initiative Nov. 8 and called on the North to match it by halting its nuclear weapons development program.

North Korea, in a message delivered to Seoul and Washington by a U.S. scholar, says it is prepared to receive international inspections on its nuclear installations as soon as South Korea and the United States are prepared to receive inspections of suspected nuclear weapons sites in the South. William Taylor, vice president for international security programs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, was given the message during a week-long visit to Pyongyang last week.

The South Korean official, who wanted to remain anonymous, said the North Korean proposal was unacceptable as it contained a condition and was a ploy by Pyongyang to escape international pressure to halt its nuclear program.

Opening nuclear facilities to outside inspection was a requirement for a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and could never be linked to any condition, he said.

It is widely believed that the United States has tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, but that the South has none of its own.

Signing a nuclear safeguards accord with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] was the first step toward building political and military confidence between the South and the North, he said.

"Since the IAEA does not require the North to abandon its nuclear reprocessing facilities, we may tackle this issue head-on in inter-Korean talks," he said.

There have been no contacts of any sort between the United States and North Korea dealing with Pyongyang's nuclear program.

The United States has made clear it will not contact the North unless Pyongyang stops trying to develop nuclear weapons, he said.

Spent Nuclear Fuel May Be Sent Abroad

SK1011141891 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 10 Nov 91 p 2

[Text] South Korea, now having pledged not to have a reprocessing plant, is considering sending its spent nuclear fuel abroad for reprocessing, said Science and Technology Minister Kim Chin-hyon yesterday.

"But for now the government's plan is to keep spent nuclear fuel at domestic storage sites," Kim said while speaking before the National Assembly Budget Settlement Committee early yesterday morning.

There are now some doubts about the cost-effectiveness of recycling used nuclear fuel, but when the prices of uranium soar and domestic nuclear plants become bigger, the government will consider having spent fuel reprocessed abroad, Kim said.

He cited as examples Japan, Germany and Switzerland which recycle their used fuel at facilities in Britain, France or the Soviet Union.

In a surprise announcement Friday [8 November], President No vowed that Seoul will not possess nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities and called on the North to do the same.

A reprocessing plant recycles used uranium to be reused in nuclear reactors.

The facility is to make the fuel economical by using it repeatedly, but the process also produces plutonium, an extremely toxic and highly radioactive substance that is used for nuclear weapons.

The government had reportedly considered introducing foreign technology to build its own reprocessing plant.

But possible public fear of accidents and the massive capital outlays for building recycling facilities have made the government reluctant, sources said. The relatively stable prices of uranium are another factor.

Above all, they said, the government, by denying any plan to build reprocessing facilities, are now better placed to pressure North Korea to follow suit.

North Korea is believed to have been building a reprocessing plant in Yongbyon, south of Pyongyang.

Defense Minister Yi Chong-ku told the National Assembly yesterday that Pyongyang will be able to arm itself with nuclear weapons in one or two years as its reprocessing plant is expected to go into operation in 1992 with the plutonium-production capacity of 50 to 60 tons a year.

Currently, domestic nuclear power plants keep their used fuel at "storage pools" at the plant sites, said Chong Ki-chung, an atomic energy expert at the Nuclear Environment Management Center.

Since the pools are running out of their storage capacity, however, the government is planning to build a "centralized storage pool," which will collect and keep all the nation's spent fuel, Chong said.

Though not much publicized, the government has been ambitious with its nuclear-power plant program.

The government has plans to build 18 more nuclear power plants by the year 2006. Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Planning Board Minister Choe Kak-kyu told the Assembly. Choe heads the National Atomic Energy Commission, the nation's highest policy-making body on atomic energy.

But Choe denied the opposition's allegation that the government plans to build 50 nuclear plants by 2030.

Meanwhile, opposition Democratic Party spokesman No Mu-hyon was worried that the government has given up developing core nuclear technology—which is, reprocessing knowhow—which is integral to the independent development of the national economy.

The government has been promoting nuclear energy as the future energy source that it says will power the nation "cheaply and cleanly."

But citizen activists protested that it will damage the environment and endanger human lives.

TAIWAN

Atomic Council To Host Pacific Nuclear Talks

OW1911082991 Taipei CNA in English 0800 GMT
19 Nov 91

[Text] Taipei, Nov. 19 (CNA)—An official of the Soviet nuclear society will attend the 8th Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference to be held in Taipei April 12-16, 1992, an Atomic Energy Council official said Monday.

Liu Kuang-chi, council secretary general, said, however, that Communist China's representative will not be able to attend because of political considerations.

Liu said the Pacific Nuclear Council, which groups such nuclear advanced countries as the United States, Japan, Korea, the Soviet Union, Communist China, Canada, Sweden and Germany, is basically a non-political international organization dedicated to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and exchanges of nuclear technology and experience.

Liu said that Wang Dexi, president of the Mainland Chinese nuclear society, earlier faxed a message that he would be unable to attend the conference because of political considerations. He cited the example of a Chinese herb medicine expert from the mainland who was forced to cut short his trip to Taiwan earlier this year because of his Communist Party membership.

Liu replied that the rules and regulations governing exchange of visits of people on two sides of the Taiwan Straits are being deliberated by the Legislative Yuan. If they are approved, Mainland Chinese will be allowed to participate in all academic meetings held in Taiwan.

HUNGARY

Minister Denies SFRY, Chechen Arms Sales

LD261111691 Budapest MTI in English 0906 GMT
26 Nov 91

[Text] Budapest, November 26 (MTI)—“Hungary does not deliver weapons to Yugoslavia and has no knowledge of groups engaged in arms sales,” says Andras Galszecszy, minister without portfolio supervising the information and national security offices, in the Tuesday edition of the daily “NEPSZABADSAG” with regard to a recent TASS report that A. Shishani, board member of the Chechen party Islamic Road, stayed in Hungary from November 15-18. His task was to seek contact with the

arms-selling groups which also deliver weapons to Yugoslavia, TASS said quoting “knowledgeable sources”.

“Such a visit by Mr Shishani would have been surprising all the more so as weapons are probably available at several places between the Caucasus and western border of the Soviet Union, all nearer to Chechen territory than Budapest,” Galszecszy says.

“Should the information have really leaked out from intelligence sources, the minister would be ‘happy’ if the Soviet authorities shared it with him in future, since the sharing of such information by the relevant services goes to strengthen stability and the struggle against terrorism. The Hungarian authorities received no information from Moscow about the alleged Shishani trip,” the newspaper says, quoting the Hungarian minister without portfolio.

BRAZIL**Sale of Nuclear Plant Equipment to Iran Denied**

PY3011012891 Brasilia Voz do Brasil Network
in Portuguese 2100 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] Infrastructure Minister Joao Santana today denied in Sao Paulo that Brazil is willing to negotiate the sale of the Angra 3 nuclear plant's equipment.

He denied the report published by a Sao Paulo newspaper that negotiations in this regard are being carried out with the Iranian Government. What the Brazilian Government wants to do is to finish the Angra 2 project, Santana said. And even if it wanted to sell the Angra 3 equipment, Brazil still would need to sign the Vienna Treaty that restricts the sale of nuclear equipment only for peaceful purposes, he added.

[Begin recording] The government wants to finish Angra 2, 60 percent of which already has been completed. Regarding Angra 3, we already have made a decision to not make any more investments in this project merely because we have no resources. But in principle, the equipment is not for sale. However, if we finally decide not to build Angra 3, it is obvious that we are going to reduce the damage caused to Brazilian society due to errors that prevented development in this area by selling part of the equipment. But we are going to the market and see who is interested in buying Angra 3. If there is anyone willing to pay for it, we are going to sell it. [end recording]

The infrastructure minister made this statement while participating in a meeting in Sao Paulo with businessmen of the PNBE, National Trends of Entrepreneurial Bases [Pensamento Nacional das Bases Empresariais].

Strategic Affairs Official Lauds Nuclear Accord

PY2911020491 Brasilia Voz do Brasil Network
in Portuguese 2100 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] Presidential Strategic Affairs Secretary Pedro Paulo Leoni Ramos said today that the agreement between Brazil and Argentina for the peaceful use of nuclear energy is another step forward in the path of a Latin America free of nuclear arms. The secretary said the government will sign the agreement only after Congress authorizes it.

[Begin recording] This is a four-party agreement. Participating, ... signing the agreement are Brazil, Argentina, [name indistinct] Agency, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. We expect, ... we will follow the evolution of this process in Congress. Obviously, no other step will be taken before the agreement's approval by Congress. Only Congress has the authority to approve the Brazil-Argentina agreement. [end recording]

Strategic Affairs Secretary Pedro Paulo Leoni today attended a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies'

National Defense Committee to discuss the Brazil-Argentina nuclear agreement.

Angra 3 Nuclear Project Cost at \$1.1 Billion

PY0412010091 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO
in Portuguese 2 Dec 91 Section 1 p 5

[Report by Sylvio Costa and Sonia Mossri from FOLHA's Brasilia bureau]

[Excerpts] The government wants to sell equipment for the Angra 3 nuclear project, which has already used up \$1.1 billion but whose construction has not yet started. Only excavation work has been carried out thus far.

All there is at the Angra 3 construction site in Angra dos Reis (154 km from Rio de Janeiro) is a giant hole, which is proof of the mishaps stemming from the Brazilian-German nuclear cooperation agreement signed in 1975.

Sixteen years after the signing of the agreement, the government has already spent \$5 billion for the Angra 2 and Angra 3 nuclear projects, both of which still are not generating a single kilowatt of electricity. With \$5 billion it would be possible to build 5,000 CIAC's (Integrated Support Centers for Children).

In Angra 3 alone Brazil has already spent \$600 million just to pay the interest and principal to German banks which have agreed to finance the project.

According to Sergio Guimaraes, general coordinator of Furnas Electric Power Plants, Inc. (the state-owned company that administers Brazilian nuclear plants), \$150 million were invested in the equipment that Iran wants to buy. The remaining \$350 million were used in designing the project, in foundation work, and maintenance services on equipment. [passage omitted]

Brazil and Argentina are currently negotiating their admission into the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which Collor would like to formally complete on 13 December during his visit to Vienna (Austria). Recent remarks by Infrastructure Minister Joao Santana has unearthed old fears about Brazil.

These fears are mounting in light of widespread rumors that Brigadier Hugo de Oliveira Piva is carrying out activities in Iran. Piva had been an adviser to the Iraqi Armed Forces until the outbreak of the Persian Gulf war. Needless to say, another factor has been the close trade ties, which included arms sales, existing between Brazil and Iraq until January 1991.

INDIA

U.S. Opposition to Reactor Sale Noted

BK0212153591 Delhi PATRIOT in English
20 Nov 91 p 4

[Editorial: "Reacting to Reactor Sale"]

[Text] Predictably, the proposal of sale by India to Iran of an India-made 10-megawatt [MW] reactor has caused a flutter in the West. The U.S. has reacted sharply. Some of Western paranoia is no doubt understandable, after the revelation made recently by the UN inspection team of how the West had underestimated President Saddam Husayn's ability to follow through his military nuclear plans. Western manufacturers have, through open and clandestine channels, sold equipment necessary for pursuit of military nuclear arms not only by Iraq but also Israel, South Africa and Pakistan. Advanced technology and training have been freely supplied by Western companies sometimes with the knowledge of their governments. But Iran's situation is different: its relations with the West are not normal. Since the destruction of Iraqi nuclear facilities, following the Gulf war, the nuclear balance in the region has shifted to favour Israel. Iran has been vociferously calling upon Muslim countries to acquire a nuclear bomb in order to counter Israeli nuclear capability. Nevertheless, Western fears over the proposal of sale of an Indian reactor seem largely unfounded. The proposal has not been accepted by either side yet. The acquisition of a research reactor alone cannot give Iran military nuclear capability. Besides, the high cost reprocessing facility Iran does not possess and cannot set up without the world coming to know of it. Reprocessing would be required before waste fuel can be converted into weapons grade material. Iran, being a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, will have its nuclear plans subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The Indian Government has pledged to subject its export of nuclear reactors to international safeguards. Such a promise, coming from a country that has strictly prohibited the spread of nuclear as well as the so-called dual-use technology, should be considered an adequate assurance by the West. The U.S. outcry shows double standards characterising the Western nations' nuclear policy. Atomic Energy commission Chairman P.K. Iyengar has pointed out that the Americans themselves have sold a five-MW reactor to Iran. Similar sales of reactors by Argentina to Algeria and Peru have not been forbidden by the U.S. Iraq showed that it had attempted to develop nuclear capability with the help of the Western countries. It is thus reasonable to assume that the U.S. objection to the proposed Indian sale of research reactor lies elsewhere. The export would, if it were carried out, establish India as one of the few countries capable of producing and exporting high technology products. Obviously what the West finds unpalatable about the proposed sale is the encroachment on what has hitherto been its preserve.

Coherent National Nuclear Policy Urged

BK0212160791 Delhi PATRIOT in English
25 Nov 91 p 4

[Editorial: "Defense Against N [nuclear]-Weapon"]

[Text] Non-proliferation issues have always been a sore point in Indo-U.S. relations. The U.S., in favour of a curb on horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, has long been pressing India to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. India has held back on grounds that since the treaty does not prohibit vertical proliferation, it is essentially discriminatory in nature. With the problem of non-proliferation having acquired a fresh urgency in the post-Persian Gulf war international security debate, a realistic and more purposeful exchange of views on this between Washington and New Delhi has become imperative. The visit to India of the U.S. Under-Secretary of State for International Security, Mr Reginald Bartholomew, gave an opportunity for such a discussion. Given the dramatically changed global realities, the need for a review of the two sides long-standing approach to non-proliferation can hardly be overemphasised. Clandestine proliferation in countries favoured by the West has exposed the fallacy of blind faith in the NPT's effectiveness. Meanwhile, India's nuclear policy remains largely static. She is within her rights to refuse to subscribe to a discriminatory NPT regime. Indeed, since India exploded a peaceful nuclear device in 1974, its nuclear policy has remained at a standstill. While threats of political and economic sanctions held out by the lobbies entrenched in India have scuttled all moves for repeating the same experiment, nuclear weapons related developments outside the NPT regime—in Pakistan and Israel, for instance—have overtaken India. While India continued to dither over its nuclear policy, both China and Pakistan, the latter clandestinely, went ahead with their nuclear weapons development programmes. In view of the traditionally adversarial relations with both these countries, India's security environment has thus been significantly altered.

Despite these developments, India failed to refashion its arguments against the NPT on the basis of security considerations such as the reality of Chinese, Pakistani, USSR and American nuclear weapons in the region. Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission P.K. Iyengar has said that India has "crossed the threshold of nuclear technology". This fact, of having crossed the threshold, has made no difference to India's strategic defence. As such India seems to incur the disadvantages of both sides. While she is excluded from the nuclear club whose membership was confined only to those who acquired weapons capability in 1968, she has lost all chances of securing a sufficient deterrent to the nuclear weapon threats being posed to her security by more than one country in the neighbourhood. Islamabad has come up with a scheme that proposes South Asia as a nuclear weapon free zone. The scheme presumably excludes the nuclear weapons already deployed in the South Asian region, including those of China, America and the

former USSR. The recent U.S. and Soviet votes for the Pak [Pakistan]-sponsored resolution in the UN on a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia illustrates an altered balance of power. India cannot continue with her head-in-the-sands approach. She must tell the country what strategic defence the Government has in mind to counter the menace of the N-weapon powers in the region. Mr Bartholomew's visit affords an occasion for New Delhi to discard its essentially reactive policy on non-proliferation and instead discuss concrete proposals more suited to her strategic interests. At a time when nuclearisation of South Asia has become a reality, a discussion on "no-first-use" can be a useful option to pursue. But that suggestion presupposes that India is a nuclear-weapon State, which it is not.

MP's Urge Government To Resist U.S. Pressure

BK2011163891 Hong Kong AFP in English 1133 GMT 20 Nov 91

[Text] New Delhi, Nov 20 (AFP)—Indian MPs [member's of parliament] urged the government Wednesday to resist U.S. pressure and go ahead with the controversial sale of a nuclear research reactor to Iran.

Suresh Kalmadi of the ruling Congress (I) Party raised the issue in parliament's upper house, saying exports of nuclear reactors should not be allowed to be a monopoly of the industrialised world.

"In no case should the government buckle under U.S. pressure," Kalmadi said in a brief statement supported by colleagues and MPs from the opposition Janata Dal (People's Party).

Kalmadi said it was "strange" that Washington was trying to dissuade India from exporting the reactor after having sold one to Tehran itself.

The matter came up in parliament on the opening day of its month-long winter session, a day before U.S. Under-secretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew was due to begin a visit here.

New Delhi's offer to sell the 10-megawatt nuclear reactor to Tehran is expected to figure high in his talks here which follow expressions of concern by the United States at the Indo-Iranian deal, reportedly still under negotiation.

India's top nuclear scientist, P.K. Iyengar, told THE HINDUSTAN TIMES in remarks published Tuesday that the proposed sale was in no way a secret deal and would be under international safeguards.

"Perhaps the Western countries do not want us to get into high technology exports ... The Americans had already supplied a five-megawatt reactor to Iran which is still working," Iyengar, chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, said.

"Our offer to Iran is exactly like the nuclear reactors set up by Argentina in Algeria and Peru and the recent offer

it has made to Turkey... Perhaps only the white man has the right to sell nuclear reactors," Iyengar said.

THE INDIAN EXPRESS reported Wednesday that Iran was also keen to import a 220-megawatt pressurised heavy water reactor used in power generation which India has made locally.

Washington has expressed fears at the possibility that Iran, which recently called for Islamic countries to arm themselves with nuclear weapons to counter Israel's capability, would "misuse" civilian nuclear materials.

New Delhi says the reactor is designed for "peaceful uses of nuclear energy."

Indian officials have said in the past that the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in Bombay had developed small reactors which it could sell to Third World countries planning to launch basic research programmes, but denied they could be put to military use.

India, which is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in 1974 carried out an underground nuclear test. It claims its atomic programme is entirely geared towards generating electricity.

Pakistani Nuclear-Free Plan Critized

BK2011123791 Delhi All India Radio General Overseas Service in English 1010 GMT 20 Nov 91

[Commentary by Ajay K. Roy, special correspondent of the NATIONAL HERALD: "Pakistan-Bangladesh Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Proposal"]

[Text] Pakistan after many abortive bids got its oft-repeated proposal for making South Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone—NWFZ—which is totally unrelated to geopolitical realities of the region—passed by the Political and Security Committee of the UN General Assembly. The committee voted the draft cosponsored by Bangladesh by 104 to three. To India's chagrin, the Soviet Union, along with Ukraine and Belorussia, were among the supporters. The resolution will shortly be taken up by the General Assembly where the lineup should not be any different from that in the committee.

Sensing India's displeasure at Soviet support for the Pakistan proposal, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev has assured the Indian foreign minister, Mr. Madhav Singh Solanki, of his government's continued commitment to friendly ties with India. Notwithstanding such assurance, India has quite justifiably stuck to its principled stand.

The Pakistani draft does not fulfill the basic requirement of a consensus on the issue of NFWZ on the basis of prior consultations. These arrangements arise out of the shared perceptions of the states of the region regarding special features and geography and extent of regulations and consultations. The NFWZ's have been established in other parts of the world as a result of arrangements freely arrived at and agreed to by the countries of the region. India was thus in favor of global consensus for these

zones. More so, India's position is based on principles that determine disarmament policy. Nuclear disarmament is a global issue and general and complete disarmament cannot be achieved by partial measures. The global reach of nuclear weapons and their deployment diminish the importance of regional nuclear NWFZ's.

As stated in the draft, the NWFZ proposal addresses Pakistan's strategic concerns, ignoring India's security calculations. The most important of this is China's membership of the nuclear club. Pakistan's own nuclear ambition is an equally crucial consideration from India's point of view. It may be recalled here that the U.S. Administration in October last had suspended economic and military aid to Islamabad when Mr. George Bush failed to certify to the Congress that Pakistan does not have a nuclear bomb nor a weapons program.

China's recent decision to join the Nonproliferation Treaty—NPT—is designed to provide camouflage to continue past policies through duplicity. The treaty imposes no restrictions on signatories which exploded a nuclear device before 1967. So, by agreeing to adhere to the NPT, China believes it has a license to go on with its 10-year program of doubling its nuclear armory, (2way) larger than the combined British and French arsenals. It has failed to respond to the recent unilateral U.S. and Soviet arms control initiatives, especially the plans to withdraw or eliminate all ground- and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons.

Some of China's actions are undercutting the very basic goal of the treaty. After providing Pakistan with weapon designs and missile technology to deliver nuclear arms, China is now fueling the nuclear ambitions of Iran. The clandestine Chinese assistance to Iran includes the transfer of enriched uranium and equipment to process fissile material. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee was told 17 October that it is pretty well established that Pakistan's nuclear program has been built using Chinese designs.

These strategic concerns apart, the Soviet acquiescence at the UN denotes a change in its perceptions, and the apparent policy shift should enable New Delhi to waive the new factors that will influence the recasting of Indo-Soviet relations. India should consider that the Kremlin in future will increasingly respond to dissenting views on Moscow's foreign policy, both at the Supreme Soviet and republic levels. Also till such time as the Soviet Union has settled down to new equilibrium, a certain ambivalence or lack of dynamism is likely to mark the bilateral exchanges. The trade protocol between the two countries will no longer be the same as in the past. To begin with, the trade protocol for 1992 may be signed with Russia rather than the Soviet Union, the reason being that the old Soviet Union has formally given way to a new union of only 12 republics, many of whom are still squabbling about the extent of autonomy they should get. Russia accounts for the bulk of sales to and purchases from India and so an Indo-Russian deal will by itself keep the core of Indo-Soviet trade intact till

further arrangements are made. Not only the ties with the Soviet Union are poised for a review, but also the gamut of foreign policy.

The UN General Assembly's overwhelming support to the concept of NWFZ is a stunning reminder that India must swiftly redefine its nuclear diplomacy. India should be prepared for increased pressure on the nuclear proliferation issue. The U.S. wanted India to accept the safeguards by signing the NPT and commended the Pakistani proposal for five-nation talks for establishing an NWFZ in South Asia. This was one of the main points made by Mr. James Baker at his recent meeting with the Indian external affairs minister. The significance of the new determinance of international relations has not been lost to the Indian policymakers, and a new regime more relevant to the current times is on the anvil.

IAEA Head Says Proposed Sale of No Concern

BK2211115891 Hong Kong AFP in English 1016 GMT 22 Nov 91

[Text] New Delhi, Nov 22 (AFP)—The proposed sale of an Indian nuclear research reactor to Iran is not a cause of concern to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the group's director general Hans Blix said here Friday.

Blix told a press conference here that Iran had signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that acquiring the 10-megawatt reactor could not lead to proliferation as long as the IAEA safeguards applied.

The possible sale of the reactor was expected to figure prominently in talks here Friday between visiting U.S. Undersecretary of State for International [Security] Affairs Reginald Bartholomew and Indian officials.

Washington has voiced strong objections to the deal, negotiations for which Indian officials insist are only in the preliminary stages, and has twice called in India's ambassador to the U.S. to make its views known.

U.S. State Department spokesmen have said they fear the reactor could be "misused" in light of a recent Iranian call for Islamic countries to acquire nuclear weapons to counteract Israel's capability.

Blix, who said he has been on a private visit here for the past week, also said that at no time during his visit had he suggested India sign the NPT.

He clarified that the IAEA Charter did not involve politics but only ensured that those countries which had signed the NPT "did not divert nuclear materials for weapons use."

He added it was "pure coincidence" that he and Bartholomew, who officials say is discussing nuclear concerns, including the possibility of New Delhi signing the NPT or agreeing to South Asia being declared a nuclear free zone, were here at the same time.

India, which exploded a nuclear device in 1974, is not a signatory to the NPT.

Envoy Reveals Qadhdhafi Request for Technology

92WP0084 Calcutta *THE TELEGRAPH* in English
11 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by Seema Sirohi]

[Text] Washington, Oct. 10—The Libyan leader, Col. Mu 'ammar al-Qadhdhafi had asked for nuclear weapons during the former Prime Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai's tenure and offered to pay an amount comparable to India's entire foreign debt, according to India's ambassador, Mr 'Abid Husayn.

Mr Husayn said at a press conference that Libya wanted to buy the technology in the late 1970s when India's foreign debt was reportedly about \$17.8 billion. He mentioned the Libyan offer at a news conference yesterday morning when asked about the latest Pakistani suggestion to have a five-power meeting on regional nuclear proliferation. The ambassador was attempting to explain that India, despite having had the technology since 1974, had not sold it to anyone, especially to leaders who do not command respect in the world fora.

Libyan attempts to acquire nuclear technology have been well known in the West for some time but that Col. Qadhdhafi had approached India was not public knowledge.

The Indian ambassador reiterated that India was for global disarmament and any regional equation must take India's concerns about China into account. His revelations about Libya are interesting in the context of a renewed effort by western nations to clamp down on technology that can be used in a nuclear weapons programme after the West Asia war. While China has sold medium-range missiles to Syria and possibly to Pakistan, India has not shared its nuclear technology despite having close relations with Arab nations.

Spokesman Denies Sale of Reactor to Iran

BK2011162891 Delhi *All India Radio Network*
in English 1530 GMT 20 Nov 91

[Text] India today categorically affirmed that there were no discussions on the sale of a nuclear reactor to Iran during the visit of the external affairs minister, Mr. Madhav Singh Solanki, to Tehran. In reply to a question, the External Affairs Ministry spokesman told newsmen in New Delhi that Mr. Solanki's talks covered in detail areas of economic cooperation with Iran. The spokesman, however, said there were discussions earlier on the sale of a nuclear reactor but these were at a preliminary stage and form part of the consultations.

On the visit of the U.S. undersecretary of state for international security affairs, Mr. Bartholomew, to New Delhi tomorrow, the spokesman said India is looking forward to his arrival and will have an exchange of views with him. The spokesman said the United States is

among the most friendly nations and New Delhi will approach the dialogue with an open mind

No 'Firm' Reactor Offer to Iran

Unofficial Source Quoted

BK2211005291 Hong Kong *AFP* in English 1740 GMT
21 Nov 91

[Text] New Delhi, Nov 21 (AFP)—India has so far made no firm offer to sell a nuclear research reactor to Iran, of which reports of a possible sale have stirred U.S. concern, the PRESS TRUST OF INDIA (PTI) reported Thursday

The news agency quoted unnamed official sources as saying that only "preliminary discussions" had been held with Tehran on the sale of the 10-megawatt reactor.

Officials described the negotiations as a "slow process," adding that since a firm offer had not been made, there was no question of withdrawing an offer.

U.S. Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew arrived here Thursday for talks with Indian officials, and the possible sale was expected to figure prominently in discussions

Washington has expressed concern at the possibility that Iran, which recently called for Islamic countries to arm themselves with nuclear weapons to counter Israel's strongly suspected nuclear capability, would "misuse" civilian nuclear materials.

India in 1974 exploded an atomic device, but has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it says is tilted heavily in favour of major nuclear powers. It says its nuclear program is not weapons-oriented

Talks Under Way

BK2211115091 Delhi *All India Radio Network*
in English 1135 GMT 22 Nov 91

[Text] Negotiations with Iran for the proposed sale of a 10-megawatt research nuclear reactor are at a preliminary stage. An External Affairs Ministry spokesman told newsmen in New Delhi today that India is only seeking to export nuclear technology permissible under the existing international laws.

Spokesman Discusses Reactor Sale

BK2211142891 Delhi *ISI Diplomatic Information Service* in English 1034 GMT 22 Nov 91

["Spokesman's Statement in Response to a Question on Sale of Nuclear Reactor to Iran and Visit of Mr. Bartholomew 20/11/91"]

[Excerpt] In response to a question as to whether during EAM's [external affairs minister's] visit to Iran Iranians formally put up a requisition for a nuclear reactor,

spokesman said "during EAM's visit to Tehran for joint commission meeting, several areas of economic cooperation were discussed, many of these in great detail. On question of nuclear cooperation, a lot has already been written in considerable detail. But I would like to categorically affirm that there was no discussion whatsoever on this subject when EAM was in Tehran." [passage omitted]

Settlement of Nuclear Issues With Pakistan Urged

92WP0079A Bombay THE SUNDAY TIMES OF INDIA in English 27 Oct 91 p 13

[Text] The nuclear issue is one that New Delhi and Islamabad can no longer leave unresolved, because the international community is losing patience with their ambivalence. The dangers of proliferation, highlighted by the evidence of Iraq's nearly successful attempt to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, have resulted in a consensus among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in favour of more stringent preventive measures, as brought out by the guidelines they adopted on October 18 after a meeting in London. It is not, therefore, fanciful to speculate that the concept of national sovereignty may not stand in the way of the U.N.'s mandating intrusive inspections, under its auspices, of facilities in suspect nations. This is the new context in which the subcontinental adversaries have to provide assurances credible not only to each other but to the world at large, that they will restrain their nuclear ambitions.

Nawaz Sharif's proposal for a five-power meeting, bringing together India, Pakistan, China, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, to agree upon a scheme for non-proliferation in the subcontinent, has been summarily rejected by India. But this was by a caretaker regime which lacked the authority to take major decisions. It is not any less difficult now, because no government in New Delhi, much less a minority one, can act on this issue without a consensus among major political parties.

Pakistan continues to demand that India sign the non-proliferation treaty [NPT] which this country has consistently denounced for the past two decades. The demand, it can be argued, is only a ploy to deflect pressures being put on Pakistan to halt its weapons programme. What the Indian political leadership has to reckon with is that a mere reiteration of this stand will no longer do; New Delhi will have to come up with a plausible alternative if it is not to find itself totally isolated.

There is much merit in the argument that an NPT is ineffective in preventing a clandestine weapons programme, as transgressions by Iraq, and earlier by Sweden, conclusively show. Signing it does not, therefore, offer either India or Pakistan a fool-proof safeguard against nasty surprises. In any event, no retroactive verification regimen can unearth bombs that each is believed to have in its basement.

Some bomb enthusiasts in both countries—among them former Indian army chief General K. Sandarji and Pakistan's Mirza Aslam Beg—are arguing in favour of acknowledging that a nuclear arsenal is already in place. A sequel to this is the proposition put forward both in India and Pakistan, that each should offer to sign the NPT as a nuclear weapons state like the U.S., the Soviet Union and Britain have done, and China and France have agreed to do. But the NPT has set a cut-off point in time that disqualifies both India and Pakistan from joining under this clause. It is not only that the other 140 signatories of the NPT may refuse to change it to suit these two. More importantly, accession in this manner will not meet the international objective of putting a cap on Indian and Pakistani nuclear capabilities, because a weapons state is, by definition, free to expand them.

If deterrence is what motivates the Indian and Pakistani weapons programmes, it can be argued that this has already been achieved, because both are believed to have bombs hidden in their basements. As Sundarji has said, military planners in both countries must obviously make this assumption. If so, neither will want to risk pushing the other to the wall. If this is the case, further build-up is not needed, because each can already inflict unacceptable damage on the other by targetting a city or two. Why not, then, fall in line with any plan which has the potential for reducing the danger of an arms race?

One step in this direction has been taken by the agreement not to attack each other's facilities, and this will become effective in the next few months, when the two exchange a list of these (something over which Pakistan is, not surprisingly, taking its time). The second should be, as K. Subrahmanyam and others have persuasively argued, an undertaking by each not to be the first to use nuclear capabilities, the stand that the Soviet Union and China have adopted for many years now in respect of their nuclear weapons. Since both New Delhi and Islamabad have voted year after year at the U.N. in favour of a ban on the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons, a declaration of self-restraint involves no departure from established policies.

Once mutual restraint is established, it may be possible to think of going further. Brazil and Argentina, bitter nuclear rivals for many years, have now agreed to open their facilities to mutual inspection. India and Pakistan can do the same, if the deterrent capability that has already been established is accepted by the respective policy-makers as sufficient. It is also possible to hope that once mutual accommodation gets under way by agreeing on the non-first use, the two will desist—as they have so far done—from incorporating this horror weapon in their war-fighting strategy. If they do so, they will save themselves the significant additional costs involved in readying themselves to use these weapons in the course of a conflict, instead of as a last resort.

Some bomb enthusiasts claim that going nuclear will help to cut down the total defence outlay. The argument in India runs that once nuclear deterrence has been

explicitly established, maintaining an edge in conventional arms (as New Delhi has done all along) will no longer be absolutely necessary. But Sundarji, who claims to have given the issue much thought, acknowledges that there will be no savings in conventional force in the foreseeable future, and this part of defence will continue to require, as now, an outlay equivalent of around 3.5 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Nuclear capability will, in his judgment, call for an additional expenditure of half to one per cent of the GDP. This is an unthinkable proposition for the next few years, while India needs large inflows of aid to get out of the economic mess that it has gotten itself into. Vulnerability in this regard does restrict a nation's freedom of action, as any honest Indian policy-maker has to acknowledge. It should be some consolation, however, to know that Pakistan is in exactly the same situation.

Alternative for Nonproliferation Pact Needed

92WP0078A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 28 Oct 91 p 12

[Editorial: "Nuclear Baiting"]

[Text] Dr A.Q. Khan's self-congratulatory claim about Pakistani nuclear capabilities, and their laborious disavowal subsequently by the country's spokesman, have now become a familiar routine. It has been argued that the unstated purpose of Dr Khan's boasts is to remind the Indian leadership that Pakistan cannot be trifled with because of the bombs it has in the basement. But this is hardly necessary since we know from post-retirement pronouncements of the former army chief, Gen K. Sundarji, that military planners on both sides are already factoring into their calculations the danger of a nuclear escalation. It seems, therefore, that Dr Khan's seemingly indiscreet disclosures are intended to achieve other ends. One may be to provoke New Delhi into acknowledging more clearly than it has so far done that it can counter Islamabad's threat in kind, and thus lay itself open to the pressures that Washington and other capitals have been putting on Pakistan to restrain its nuclear ambitions. If this is the case, some people in India are unwittingly aiding and abetting what Islamabad is trying to achieve via Dr Khan by their arguments that New Delhi's low-key response to him suggests that it is still unwisely desisting from moving to a comparable state of readiness. Another motive for the Pakistani ploy may be to regain the strategic relevance it has lost following the end of the Cold War by flaunting its nuclear prowess. Since the facts in this regard are no doubt already well-known to concerned governments, this seems equally pointless. The hope perhaps is that friends in the West may be able to make use of Pakistani assertions to persuade decision-makers to be more accommodating towards it. This may boomerang but it is evidently a risk that the hawks in Pakistan are prepared to take.

Whatever the explanation, no Indian interest is served by rising to Dr Khan's bait. The government has time

and again declared that, if push comes to shove, India will not allow its military to be placed at a disadvantage. That should be sufficient to allay public anxieties, while at the same time making clear to Pakistan that India has an adequate retaliatory capability. This should be accompanied by renewed efforts to assure the international community that India remains firmly committed to its stand in favour of a ban on the use, or the threat of use, of horror weapons and is willing to take initiatives in this regard in the South Asian context. While reiterating India's rejection of the inequitable nuclear non-proliferation treaty, New Delhi has to put forward a credible alternative for eliminating the danger of a nuclear weapons race in the sub-continent.

Nuclear, Chemical Arms Discussed With Pakistan

92WP0077A Madras THE HINDU in English
1 Nov 91 p 1

[Article by Kesava Menon]

[Text] Islamabad, Oct 31—India and Pakistan have agreed to consider issuing a joint declaration on chemical weapons and to convene a meeting of experts of the two sides, at a mutually convenient date, to exchange views on a bilateral agreement to ban the development, production, deployment and use of chemical weapons.

These were among the points on which India and Pakistan reached some agreement after the conclusion here today of the fifth round of talks at the Foreign Secretary level. An assessment of the progress made at the talks can also be gauged from the agreement to advance the exchange of coordinates of their nuclear installations and facilities in pursuance of the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities. As a result of some hitches the exchange of detailed list of map-coordinate to fix the location of either countries' nuclear installations and facilities had been put off till the end of January 1992. Now the exchange is to take place before the end of 1991.

A resume of the points on which the two sides agreed were set out in a joint statement issued after the three sessions of talks which the Indian and Pakistani side had since Wednesday. The two sessions yesterday (and a tete-a-tete which Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr Muchkund Dubey, had with his Pakistani counterpart, Mr. Shaharyar Khan) were devoted to bilateral issues. At today's session, held in the salubrious climate of Murree, a hill state 60 km from here, the two sides ranged over multilateral issues.

The two sides agreed that the dialogue on the Siachen issue should be resumed at an early date. India had sought to push the approach that the subject matter for discussions was of redeployment of troops from the glacier by the two countries and that this dialogue need not be cluttered by discussions of cartographical and other such political matters. It is learnt that Pakistan has,

without abandoning its positions on cartographical and political aspects, agreed to explore the possibilities of this kind of approach.

While the two sides did discuss the issues of nuclear non-proliferation the Pakistan side was said to have conceded that there was merit in the Indian stance that the two countries first bilaterally concretise what was sought to be achieved in this direction before taking up, if necessary, the Pakistan Prime Minister's proposal for a five-nation conference on non-proliferation in South Asia.

Polymakers Divided Over Nonproliferation Pact

92WP0082A Madras INDIAN EXPRESS in English
10 Oct 91 pp 1, 9

[Text] EXPRESS NEWS SERVICE New Delhi, Oct. 9—The Indian nuclear policy making establishment seems to be divided over the stand that should be taken on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) in the face of renewed pressures to sign it.

The hardline position taken by India that the NPT is discriminatory and is no guarantee against proliferation has been reiterated by Dr. P.K. Iyengar, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. In his address last month to the general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, he indicated a major policy shift by stating publicly that although India had "crossed the threshold in nuclear technology," it was exercising "self-restraint."

While Dr. Iyengar has emphasised self-restraint as being more important in preventing proliferation than signing any formal treaties, three alternative approaches to the NPT are also being floated. One of them suggests that India should now go ahead and sign the NPT; another suggests signing the NPT but seeking US connivance for covert development of weapons; and then there is a suggestion that India should opt for a half-way house between signing the treaty and the present Indian position.

The last proposal is being floated along with a campaign against Dr. Iyengar's speech at the IAEA general conference. An influential member of the nuclear policy making establishment, no longer with the Department of Atomic Energy, has been lobbying the government and some media pundits on the approach to the NPT and the inadvisability of Dr. Iyengar's statement on India having crossed the nuclear "threshold."

Up to now India was considered a nuclear "threshold" state but not one that admitted crossing it. Although Dr. Iyengar may take refuge in the ambiguity implicit in the term "nuclear technology," the word "threshold" has a very specific meaning in the nuclear jargon and refers to weapons capability.

Dr. Iyengar is being attacked on three grounds: that by suggesting that India had crossed the nuclear "threshold" but was exercising "self-restraint," he is pushing

India to take a challenging position on proliferation by incorporating an element of choice in restraint that he is being apologetic for Iraq's breach of its NPT obligations; and that he is losing friends for India in the international community.

The crucial sentences in Dr. Iyengar's IAEA address on crossing the nuclear "threshold" read as follows: "...It is clear that signing an agreement or treaty by itself is not the recipe for preventing proliferation. What is more important is self-restraint and I am glad to say that India, despite having crossed the threshold in nuclear technology, continues to exercise self-restraint."

As for the charge of minimising the significance of the Iraqi breach of the NPT, the address of Dr. Iyengar questions the directions in which IAEA's "intrusive inspection activities" may lead. Dr. Iyengar says in his address: "It is our firm belief that emphasis on "special inspections" or what we may call as "challenge inspections" beyond the provisions of existing documents are bound to vitiate the atmosphere, for the simple reason that "challenge inspections" by their very nature, presuppose acquisition by the agency of information through questionable means. "This is being described as an attempt to defend a Saddam Hussein or a Gaddafi by resorting to a high moral posture.

Package suggested: Simultaneously, it is being suggested that India should follow a package of policies which go half-way to signing the NPT. This package is being lobbied for not only with the Prime Minister's office and media commentators but surprisingly also with the Finance Ministry.

The package contains, like all such proposals, a spectrum of strategies. It suggests that:

(A) India should legitimise its status as a nuclear weapons capable power without actually assembling war-heads and missiles.

(B) India should behave as though it were a signatory of the NPT in controlling proliferation of nuclear technology to other countries. Later, the signing of the NPT (presumably, as a nuclear weapons capable state) could also be contemplated.

(C) India should obtain access to peaceful nuclear and other advanced technologies without having to bring its own nuclear and missile technologies under international safeguards, and

(D) India should play by the rules of the nuclear weapons club as far as the development and deployment of future military technologies are concerned

Coincidentally, this and the other proposals about the stand on the NPT are being floated at a time when the USIS is sponsoring a seminar for confidence building between India and Pakistan. It is being hosted by Mr

Paul Kriesberg at Neemrana in Rajasthan and is being attended by "non-official" participants such as the Indian strategic pundit, Mr. K. Subramanyam and the former Pakistan foreign secretary, Mr. Niaz Naik. Mr. Kriesberg, according to press reports, is widely believed to have been very high up in the US intelligence hierarchy in India in the 1970s and is now believed to have retired.

Advance in Pressurized Water Reactors Noted

92WP0083A Madras *INDIAN EXPRESS in English*
28 Oct 91 p 9

[Article by Ramakrishna Upadhyay: "A Danger Hangs Over Narora"]

[Excerpt] Narora (UP), Oct. 27—[passage omitted] Dr. P.K. Iyengar, chairman of Atomic Energy Commission and the high priest of nuclear energy, who faced a barrage of questions from journalists at Narora exuded confidence about the safety of NAPS [expansion unknown] rounding off with his typical bluster: "We are in such a safe region that people should take shelter at the plant site at the time of an earthquake." Mr. Y.S.R. Prasad, project director of NAPS, said the safety system at Narora had been considerably scaled up and provided with an automatic shut-off within a period of 1.4 seconds.

DR. Iyengar also dismissed reports about radiation effects in some villages surrounding the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station as highly exaggerated and not true. He revealed that every single minor happening in the eight nuclear power plants around the country was promptly reported to bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international organisations. Then, why isn't the Indian public taken into confidence when such incidents happen? Again in the typical style of functioning of the nuclear establishment, Dr. Iyengar maintained that 'outsiders' did not understand the intricacies of problems and the fears got exaggerated.

Laudable as the achievements of the Atomic Energy Commission are in carrying on with indigenous development, after virtual isolation from the international community following the 1974 Pokhran atomic explosion, it is this cloak of secrecy even where public safety is involved which has made the nuclear establishment suspect in the eyes of the country's intelligentsia.

The successful commissioning of the second unit of Narora power station which will contribute 220 MW of energy to the power starved northern electricity region is a significant landmark in that it is the forerunner of indigenously designed and standardised pressurised heavy water reactors to be built in the country. India is the only developing country outside the nuclear club which has demonstrated the capability to design and construct pressurised heavy water reactors. All the major components like fuel tubes, coolant channels, uranium pellets and heavy water required as moderator are produced in the country.

After Narora I went into operation in 1989, several systems which have no direct bearing on the nuclear plant, but form part of the secondary systems, like turbines, stand-by power supplies and fuel handling have been improved, giving confidence to engineers to accelerate the future expansion of the nuclear power programme.

The two units of the Kakrapar power station (235 MW each) are expected to go into production in early 1992 and 1993, the first two units of Kaiga and the third and fourth units (all 235 MW each) of Rajasthan Atomic Power Station in 1994 and 1995.

Dr. Iyengar predicted that the target of 10,000 MW of nuclear energy by the turn of the century might be achieved by the year 2002 or 2003 A.D. Even then, the contribution of nuclear energy to the overall energy output in the country, would be much less than that obtaining in many developed countries.

Given the ecological hazards of large hydroelectric projects, thrown into bold relief by the last week's earthquake, and the inherently inefficient functioning of many of the thermal power projects round the country, the nuclear plants offer a choice—may be a devil's choice—which can hardly be ignored.

Atomic Research Center Transfers Technologies

92WP0081 New Delhi *PATRIOT in English*
15 Oct 91 p 5

[Text] Bombay, Oct 14 (UNI)—The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) has successfully transferred 46 spin-off technologies in the current past and entered into 63 agreements with various industries for transfer.

Some of the technologies transferred from BARC and successfully being utilised by industries include Gamma switch, potable radiation monitors, enrichment of nitrogen-15, video frame processor, radiation dosimeter, nitric oxide, ozone monitors and production of zirconium and oxychloride from zircon sand.

BARC sources here said there were a number of technologies ready for transfer to industries and others, which included infrared methane [as printed] gas alarm unit, word text processor, optical encoder and display unit, high security electronic lock and pick-and-place robots.

The major thrust of the Research and Development (R&D) work undertaken in BARC was based on, or meant for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

However, a number of other spin-off technologies which are not directly related to the nuclear energy programme are generated in the process, the sources said.

While nuclear-based technologies were being developed essentially for use within the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the spin-off technologies are transferred to industries for commercial exploitation.

For this purpose, the BARC had constituted a Technology Transfer Group (TTG) with experts from various professional fields to identify and evaluate technologies based on their reliability. Large-scale reproducibility and suitability for commercial exploitation, the sources said.

The spin-off technologies have a multi-disciplinary character covering fields such as physical, chemistry, electronics, environment, health and materials, including radioisotopes.

Launch Vehicle Solid Rocket Motor Tested

92WP0080A New Delhi PATRIOT in English
18 Oct 91 p 6

[Text] Bangalore, Oct 17 (UNI)—The high energy upper stage solid rocket motor of the polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) has been successfully tested at the Sriharikota Rocket Launch (SHAR) Centre, marking an important achievement in the realisation of this vehicle which would be on its maiden flight next year.

A communique issued by Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) here today said the upper stage of the PSLV and the control system were tested at SHAR.

This was the first test in which the flex nozzle control system, which facilitated the nozzle to turn as sought by the control requirement, was proven.

The communique said data analysis at the end of the test showed that all the systems had performed as per design specifications.

The communique said the 2 metre diameter rocket motor was made of polyaramid fibre embedded in epoxy resin. It carried 7.25 tonnes of solid propellant to burn for 80 seconds and to produce a maximum thrust of 33 tonnes.

(The motor propels the PSLV upper stage and the satellite (1000 kg class) from an altitude of 160 km to 400 km, imparting an additional velocity of 2.1 km per second. It is one of the largest upper stage motors in the world.)

The design and development of the motor case, the flexible bearing actuator and power system for the thrust vector control and the ignition system were carried out by the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (VSSC), Trivandrum. The SHAR Centre had handled the propellant casting, curing and testing of the motor.

The 60-tonne liquid propulsion second stage motor was tested at the Mahendragiri on June 3, 1991.

Earlier, the ISRO had carried out the Ground Resonance Test (GRT) on the PSLV's first stage and strap-on motors last year.

In addition, the giant Mobile Service Tower (MST) along with the launch pedestal and umbilical tower were set up at the SHAR Centre for integration of the PSLV

Scientists Develop 'Nuclear Camera'

BK2211092491 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 0830 GMT 22 Nov 91

[Text] The scientists of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center in Bombay have developed a nuclear camera which has diverse applications in aerospace, ordnance, metallurgy, and biology, in addition to nuclear fields. The camera takes pictures of objects in great detail using a beam of nuclear particles called neutron. In some cases, these pictures are more useful than those taken with X-rays.

IRAN

FRG Nuclear Technology From Brazil Sought

LD0312093791 Berlin ADN in German 0204 GMT
3 Dec 91

[Excerpts] Duesseldorf (ADN)—Iran wants to gain access to nuclear technology from Brazil that it has as a result of its cooperation with the German KWU [Kraftwerksunion] power station constructor. This was confirmed by Guenter Markus, who is in charge of bilateral cooperation at the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT), in reply to an inquiry by the Duesseldorf-based HANDELSBLATT, in Tuesday's edition.

However, the Brazilian Government has assured Bonn that without the agreement of the Federal Government, no German technology will be transferred to Iran. It was agreed in the treaties signed with Brazil in 1975 and 1976 governing German-Brazilian cooperation in nuclear technology, that the transfer of nuclear know-how could take place only in agreement with the German side, the official from Federal Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber's office said. "It is certain" that Bonn will give no such agreement. [passage omitted]

The International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) in Vienna also is concerned about nuclear technology negotiations between Brazil and Iran. However, it has no way to prevent such deals, IAEA Director General Hans Blix told HANDELSBLATT; it is a matter for the Germans.

Commander on Nuclear Weapons

LD1911203691 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1030 GMT
19 Nov 91

[Text] The last phase of the Zohd-1 maneuver, with the participation of the three branches of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, ended in the southern region of the country at noon today after fully achieving the objectives of the exercise. The last phase of the maneuver began with several squadrons of the fighter

bombers of the Iranian Air Force bombing targets deep inside positions of a hypothetical enemy. Then dozens of C-130 planes dropped arms and ammunition needed by hundreds of paratroopers and helicopter operators behind the battlelines of the hypothetical enemy.

Commando rangers armed with light and medium weight weapons, utilizing military tactics and experience gained during the eight years of holy war, surrounded the forces of the hypothetical enemy and completed their mopping up operations. During this maneuver, dozens of sophisticated tanks providing cover for armored infantry forces took up positions at strategic points to protect the paratroopers.

After the conclusion of the Zohd-I maneuver, Major General Shahbazi, chief of the joint staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, referred to the Zohd-I maneuver as the largest maneuver in the history of the Iranian Armed Forces. He said: More than 50,000 Army troops, utilizing their repaired equipment, demonstrated their might and combat capability in an area of 1,500 square kilometers.

He added: The Iranian Armed Forces, in accordance with instructions of His Eminence Ayatollah Khamene'i, commander in chief of the Armed Forces, are ready for any sacrifice in order to safeguard the aspirations of the sacred system of Iran.

Rejecting the Western propaganda on Iran's search for nuclear weapons, the chief of the joint staff said: We believe war with nuclear weapons is a war against humanity. We have never sought to acquire or build such weapons for the same reason. We never consider it part of an honorable war.

Possession of Nuclear Weapons Denied

LD2311084991 Hamburg DPA in German 1609 GMT 22 Nov 91

[Text] Aachen (DPA)—Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Va'ez says Iran has no nuclear weapons. "All other statements are deliberate lies and propaganda," the minister said in an interview with AACHENER VOLK-SZEITUNG (Saturday edition) in Tehran. Iran supports the international struggle against atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. Va'ez named Germany as one of the three most important trade partners of his country. He said contacts with the Federal Government are satisfactory. (The article was prereleased in an edited version.)

ISRAEL

U.S. Warned on Sale of PRC Reactor to Syria

TA2911060591 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 29 Nov 91 p 1

[Report by Hemi Shalev and On Levi]

[Text] Yesterday Israel conveyed to the United States a severe warning regarding Syria's intention to procure a

nuclear reactor from China and said that such a deal constitutes a serious danger to regional stability. Israel is demanding that the United States act quickly to cancel the deal.

Last night, security and political sources in Israel expressed their deep concern over what is seen here as a Syrian effort to enter the nuclear era. The warning, conveyed by the defense establishment to the U.S. Administration, says that the addition of a nuclear element to Syria's aggressive tendencies is very worrisome to Israel and might lead to a deterioration in the situation in the Middle East.

There is displeasure in the defense establishment with the PRC's intention to sell a nuclear reactor to Syria. An official announcement by the Chinese Atomic Energy Agency published yesterday said that the PRC intends to sell Syria a small nuclear reactor for research purposes. It was also reported that the sale of the reactor was made through the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Last night, senior sources in the defense establishment refused to comment officially on the reports about the Chinese intention to sell the reactor. They said that although what is involved is a small nuclear reactor which does not constitute any military danger, the main threat lies in the fact that China will train Syrian scientists to operate it.

The sources also said that "it is very regrettable to see that the world has still not learned the extent of the danger inherent in the transfer of a nuclear reactor and know-how to countries run by totalitarian rulers. Not long ago, we witnessed what such rulers are capable of when they achieve nonconventional capabilities. This is a negative trend, and it is very important that it end so that the peace process can be continued."

10.5 Tonnes of Heavy Water Returned to Oslo

TA0312184991 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in English 1800 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] A report from Oslo says Israel last night returned to Norway 10.5 tonnes of heavy water. Norway decided to stop the production of heavy water after a dispute with Israel on whether it could supervise the use of such a product in a nuclear reactor.

Ministry To Transfer Funds for Radar System

TA0212082991 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew 0505 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] The Arrow project's research and development teams are still searching for the malfunction that caused the latest test to fail. The Defense Ministry will now transfer \$100 million to develop the missile's radar system. Our correspondent Yo'av Aviv is here with the details:

The Defense Ministry will transfer \$100 million to develop the Arrow missile's radar system within the

framework of its multiyear plan. The planners estimate the cost of developing the missile's radar system at \$200 million. Up until now, only \$350,000 has been invested in developing this sophisticated system. Work on the project will actually enter high gear now, with the transfer of the money. The Arrow development teams are currently hard at work to pinpoint the malfunction that led to the failure of the missile's third trial: a test firing in which the missile failed to intercept another missile.

The United States is following the efforts to find the malfunction and has announced that it will not permit another test of the missile until the faulty mechanism is found.

Defense establishment sources expressed the hope that when the money to develop the missile's radar system is received, the entire project, which is way behind schedule, will get the serious boost so important for its advancement.

PAKISTAN

Minister Discusses Nuclear Program, U.S. Aid

BK2811035891 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network
in Urdu 0200 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Excerpt] Mohammad Siddique Kanjoo, minister of state for foreign affairs, has said the national interest will not be compromised at any price. Speaking to newsmen in Islamabad yesterday, he said that Pakistan's principled stand on vital national issues has been clarified during the talks held by U.S. Under Secretary of State for Security Affairs Bartholomew with the president and the prime minister. In reply to a question on the obstruction of U.S. aid, he said that as an alternative Pakistan is implementing the policy of self-reliance to fulfill its requirements in various fields. The minister of state said Pakistan will not agree to sign the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty unilaterally.

Referring to the prime minister's proposal for making South Asia a nuclear-free zone, he said that the United States, PRC, and the Soviet Union have endorsed this. [passage omitted]

Spokesman Reaffirms Nuclear Nonproliferation Stand

BK2711144691 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network
in English 1300 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Text] Pakistan is fully committed to the objective of nuclear nonproliferation and has supported efforts at global as well as regional levels to ensure this. At a briefing in Islamabad today, a Foreign Office spokesman said at global level we have stated that Pakistan is ready to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty simultaneously with India. At the regional level, Pakistan has given a number of proposals from time to time. It has suggested since 1974 that South Asia be declared nuclear-weapon-free

zone. Other proposals include acceptance of full-scale safeguards under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], signing of nuclear test ban treaty by India and Pakistan simultaneously, and a variety of other options.

He said the latest in the series was the 6th June proposal by Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif about consultations among United States, Soviet Union, and China and India and Pakistan to ensure nuclear nonproliferation. Pakistan is encouraged by the positive response by these countries during consultations. He expressed the hope that India would also be prepared to join in the process so as to free the region from nuclear weapons.

Analyst Urges Prompt Signing of NPT

92WP0072A Karachi DAWN in English 29 Oct 91 p 13

[Article by M.P. Bhandara: "NPT: The Realistic Option."

[Text] Mr. Agha Shahi, our former foreign minister, is the doyen of our foreign policy theorists. At a recent seminar in Rawalpindi, he presented a powerful case for Pakistan not signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He is reported to have said that "signing the NPT will be tantamount to unilateral renunciation of the nuclear option."

At the same seminar, Gen. (retd) K.M. Arif made a forthright plea for Pakistan to test a nuclear weapon. Said he, "If we have got one (nuclear weapon) we should demonstrate it at the right time. The Western countries want to retain their nuclear weapons, so why should we not have it?" he questioned.

The possession—and now the demand for demonstration of a nuclear explosion—rings a chorus of bells in the Pakistani psyche. After all, Pakistan is the only country in the world since 1945 to be divided by force of external arms. The case of the Baltic republics is quite different: independence was ceded by the Soviets. The same may also prove true for Slovenia and Croatia. The Pakistani breakup of 1971 is *sui generis*.

With such memories in store it is understandable that Pakistanis are a bit hyper, on this issue. A nuclear weapon (and missile delivery system) is seen as the weapon of last resort, for the Defence of Pakistan and to ward off nuclear blackmail; indeed, if Pakistan (God forbid) is ever occupied by an enemy, to rain the cold terror of the nuclear night on the aggressor (be it even on our own territory) is the advocacy of our super-patriots. Better Dead than Defeated, is apparently their belief.

If the balance of nuclear terror has more or less worked for world peace between the superpowers, *mutatis mutandis*, the same must be true for the subcontinent.

We submit with respect that if Pakistan has developed nuclear weapons—as the Americans would have us believe—a strong case exists for joining the treaty for the following reasons:

(1) There is no precedent of a *sub rose* nuclear power joining the treaty. South Africa's reported declaration is possibly the first such case. The treaty does not require any state to destroy its stocks of fissionable materials—or weapons, on joining. As to how a non-nuclear state might have developed nuclear commodities is external to the legalities of the treaty.

(2) Mr Shahi states that in view of India's nuclear explosion of 1974, the Indian nuclear fuel cycle will be exempt from outside (IAEA) inspection, if it decides to join the NPT, "and the door opened... on a vertical proliferation of its nuclear stockpile."

France and China which in recent months have indicated a willingness to be signatory to the NPT, indeed, be exempt from the international inspection regime. The treaty provides that those states who demonstrated nuclear capability before 1 January 1967, would be so exempt.

It is far-fetched to assume that India on the basis of an explosion in 1974 can join on terms similar to the original powers. If such were the case, there would be no impediment whatever in the way of any nether world nuclear power to join the treaty. The one casualty in the process would be the treaty itself.

(3) Mr. Shahi's assertion to a "foreign policy coup" in the region—the new strategic alliance between India and the U.S. overstates the case. To moot is not Mr. Shahi's persisting anti-American bias—which at times casts a shadow on otherwise brilliant analysis—but ingrained habits of looking at the world through a pre-1989 political prism. We will revert to this aspect a little later.

(4) Mr. Shahi correctly states that the Kahuta facility will have to be opened to international inspection. An open regime, certainly will not bring an end to the nuclear research and the training of scientific cadres. By coming out of the nuclear closet, no doubt, further development of nuclear weapons must come to an end.

The fabrication of nuclear weapons is an enterprise involving several thousands of scientists, engineers and technicians. There is no question of this body of knowledge withering away, actually the opposite may well be true. Our scientists will have access to the latest nuclear research.

Germany, Japan, Canada and Sweden care for their sovereignty no less India and Pakistan. These countries have the capability of fabricating the most advanced nuclear weapons—at short notice. The self-denial of this option—apart from making a safer world—has in no way decreased or impeded nuclear research. Polemics aside the fundamental question is: Is the security of Pakistan

likely to be enhanced or lowered by our joining the NPT; and, what impact would this decision have on the Kashmir issue?

We submit that 1989 is a landmark year, similar to 1917 and 1945. The slow processes of history for reasons not fully understood, or predictable, move as quicksilver in these landmark times forming new directions which will provide the frame of political reference in the years to come.

The clarion call of 1917 set in train a collation of ideas which put paid to concepts such as "empire," "colonialism," "The white man's mission" and "gunboat diplomacy"—concepts inherited from an earlier epoch. These concepts by the end of World War II were not only seen to be monstrous by most thinking people, but, totally unnecessary. It is one of the great ironies of history that the Russian Revolution espoused in the name of Freedom ended up in girding an iron curtain around the old Russian empire.

A new wave of political and economic concepts filled the cold war years between 1945 and 1989. The Soviet Union tried to impress socialism as an alternate model to post-industrial capitalism. With the development of nuclear weapons, no old-fashioned physical conquest was possible as mutual annihilation was assured by the rival nuclear arsenals. The competition between the West and the Soviet Union was particularly intense in the Third World. Both were keen to capture minds and draw countries in spheres of influence. Countries such as Pakistan owed their geopolitical importance to the cold war. This period is now over.

The outlines of the post-modern world after 1989 are getting clearer. Unique in modern world history is the fact that one country dominates the world militarily and politically is not, economically. This by itself is a factor of instability. It remains to be seen how, and if, the balance of world power will be restored. A new Russian Federation and Japan in combination have the military, political and economic muscle to act as a counter-vailing power to the West. But, for the time being countries such as Pakistan (and India) must realign to the new realities, i.e. in India's case without the old Soviet trade and military umbrella, and in Pakistan's case without the U.S. "tilt."

Both India and Pakistan will, therefore, have to compete for American/Western attention. Pakistan has a head start of sorts with the present American administration. It would be folly to waste this advantage.

The Pakistan proposal of 6 June for a superpower regional conference with China and India, could well serve as a forum for negotiating South Asian security and NPT entry terms. Indian mendacity and obduracy at such a forum will serve Pakistani interest. Above all such a conference will mark the 'de facto' end of the Indian interpretation of the Simla Pact.

The other emerging reality in the post-1989 scenario is that the successor "ism" to socialism is nationalism. By the turn of the century, there may be up to thirty new states carved out of present-day sovereign countries. Nationalism has been described as a "conglomerate of emotions" but the nature of its clash with the old powers tends to make it in practice an anti-democratic movement.

The West will have to content combat and compromise with the ambiguous and amorphous forces now let loose by nationalism. The "contention" that we refer to above is the immense power of public opinion in the West. Western public opinion tends to favour nationalism which paved the way for Baltic independence, and is now supporting the independence movements in Slovenia and Croatia. And indeed the same sympathy is beginning to extend for an independent Kashmir. Witness last week's encounter in the U.S. Senate between Democratic Senator Claiborne Pell, well known for 'pro-India' leanings, and Mr. Edward Drerejian, a high official of the Bush administration.

Mr. Pell asked: "When you see Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union splitting up, why should not Kashmir, once a sovereign state, once again be a sovereign state, instead of being the object of a clash between India and Pakistan?" And, Mr. Pell added, "India always talked about peace, but we see that it occupies Kashmir and Sikkim." Mr. Edward Drerejian replied: "We consider Kashmir to be disputed territory and we support the efforts of India and Pakistan to try and resolve the Kashmir problem under the aegis of the Simla accords of 1972."

To sum up: Pakistan's most realistic option in the present regional and international environ is to follow the positive lead of China: declare an intent in principle to join in the NPT. The time between declaration of intent and actual joining could be used for negotiating the entry terms. The heat would be on India to make a similar declaration. It is not unrealistic for Pakistan to negotiate the principle that India's eventual entry to the treaty would not be awarded on more advantageous terms.

As regards the problems arising from the Pressler amendment—a requirement that the U.S. President must certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device before aid be disbursed or arms sold— a "rollback" of certain limited key aspects could be negotiated with the Americans. The present American administration appears to be favourably inclined to accommodate Pakistan.

Thus far, Pakistan's nuclear policy has rested on a broad inter-party unwritten consensus. The party in opposition whether it be the PDA or IJI, will propagandise this as a sellout and work towards destabilising the government. To negotiate this minefield will require statesmanship of the highest order and political accommodation. Such an agenda suits Pakistan. But will it suit Mr. Shahi and his FRIENDS?

Minister Says Nuclear Program Curbs Unacceptable

BK2111064791 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 21 Nov 91 p 1

[Excerpt] Islamabad, Nov 20—Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif said here today that Pakistan would not accept any discriminatory restriction on its peaceful nuclear programme.

This unequivocal reiteration from the Prime Minister came during a meeting with visiting U.S. Under Secretary for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew, who called on him at the Prime Minister's House here this afternoon.

Emphasising Pakistan's commitment to a nuclear-free South Asia, Nawaz Sharif referred to the various options proposed by Pakistan.

He hoped that the concerned states would appreciate the need to completely and permanently denuclearise the region. "Any solution that does not focus on the regional situation would neither be acceptable nor fruitful," he asserted. [passage omitted]

Nuclear Program Seeks Energy Self-Sufficiency

BK0512081191 Islamabad THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 5 Dec 91 p 9

[Text] Quetta, Dec. 1—Pakistan is one of the six or seven countries of the world possessing uranium enrichment capability and advancing towards peaceful goal of its nuclear programme for self-reliance in its energy requirements.

Stating this in an exclusive interview here yesterday Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan said our nuclear programme is basically aimed at achieving self-reliance in our energy requirements for industrial, economic and social progress of the country and the nation. He hoped that these objectives would Inshallah [God willing] be achieved in not too distant future.

He said we have declared time and again that Pakistan's nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only, but still there is no end to propaganda against Pakistan by vested interests.

Comparing Pakistan's peaceful nuclear programme with Indian programme, Dr. Qadeer said India's war with China in 1962 gave greater fillip to its nuclear programme because Indian army proved to be paper tiger before the Chinese armed forces. So in 1974, India conducted a nuclear explosion and became an atomic power.

India has also manufactured ballistic missiles and other weapons proving its nuclear programme weapons oriented. Yet India claims pursuing peaceful nuclear programme.

Dr. Qadeer maintained as against this Pakistan has done nothing. She is willing to sign NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] and open its nuclear facility to international inspection provided India does the same.

Such offer is not trust worthy for some world powers. Dr. Qadeer added that discrimination would never be acceptable to Pakistan. He said so far as Pakistan's defence is concerned there is nothing to worry about it. Pakistan defence is in strong hands. It is fully capable of defending its sovereignty and integrity with closer cooperation of the armed forces and the people.

Answering a question about American arms aid to Pakistan he said "we could very well do without it", elaborating his point Dr. Qadeer pointed out that American aid was around 110 to 112 million dollars per annum.

When calculated it comes to about two dollars per head in Pakistan worth one and half chicken.

He said Pakistan and other Muslim countries have tremendous resources. If these resources are pooled together and put to judicious use, Muslim Ummah [community] would need no foreign aid.

Replying to another question, Dr. Qadeer referred to emergence of independent Islamic republics in Central Asia. As part of a super-power these Islamic republics have advanced technology and know-how. Their scientific and technological knowledge as well as material, monetary and manpower resources of other Muslim countries could be beneficial for the progress and prosperity of Muslim Ummah including Pakistan.

He said Pakistan under dynamic leadership of Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif has adopted a realistic and practical policy of self-reliance and self-sustained economy. He said with the successful implementation of this policy Pakistan Inshallah would become an aid giving country instead of aid seeking.

He said by the grace of God Pakistan is already on take-off stage, providing employment for people from India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and other countries on an almost the same pattern as our people going to Europe, America and Middle East.

Indigenous Nuclear 'Breakthrough' Praised

92WP0072C Lahore THE NATION in English
6 Nov 91 p 6

[Editorial: "A Nuclear Know-How"]

[Text] To claim that Pakistan has achieved a breakthrough in nuclear technology with the upgradation of the atomic reactor of PINSTECH, would probably be an exaggeration. But to claim that yet another stride has been made in that direction would be nearer the reality. The U.S.-supplied 5MW experimental reactor, that now stands upgraded, was received by Pakistan in 1966. As it had outlived its prescribed life, Pakistan had to decide to either retool it or scrap it. One is happy that it was

decided to retool it. Because with the ban on the export of nuclear technology of all kinds to Pakistan by the Western countries, there was no way Pakistan could have acquired even such a small reactor for training. After changes in its design the reactor, it is claimed, would attain of a capacity of 10MW and get another 25 years as lease of its life. Apparently it was possible to do so because the basic machinery was there and not many sophisticated parts had to be imported from abroad. Even then it would have been almost impossible to run it without help from China, which has agreed to keep us supplied with its fuel of enriched uranium. Pakistan, it seems, has already had the know-how of economising in fuel. It converted the present reactor in the 1970s from the U.S. specified 90 per cent enriched uranium to its present 20 per cent enriched uranium. Ironical as it may seem, it is the U.S., which by closing all doors on Pakistan in this field and by persuading others to do so, finally pushed Pakistan into achieving more and more sophistication in the application of its nuclear tool. k Driven to its own devices, Pakistan has, to the surprise of the U.S., run both the KANUPP power plant and the PINSTECH reactor, not only efficiently but also with considerable ingenuity.

Yet the U.S. can, and perhaps does derive some satisfaction from the fact that Pakistan has not so far been able to manufacture any reactor of its own. There are in fact very few countries in the world, which can. Yet if Pakistan has to progress at all towards self-sufficiency in this crucial sector, this is one hurdle it will somehow have to cross—even though it may have to do so in collaboration with someone else. Because therein lies the only solution to its perennial energy problems. To hope that help would come from the West at a future date, would be futile. At least a beginning should now be made in acquiring knowledge of the complexities and sophistication of metallurgy and the tooling of metal components—which are said to be the only way to get to such goals. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission is playing a useful role by training scientists in the field of reactor manufacturing. This training should be put to use now.

'Ambivalent' Stance on Program Seen Beneficial

92WP0072B Karachi DAWN in English 30 Oct 91 p 11

[Article by Rifaat Hamid Ghani: "Can We Go Nuclear?"]

[Text] Most of us have by now assumed that we could "go nuclear:" it is just a matter of crossing the threshold. The severity with which Pakistan is being treated for its nuclear pretensions also indicates that these have enough substance as to be disconcertingly close to realisation.

Ambivalence and ambiguity can have a utility. They allowed nuclear development up to this presently still undefined point. But in the face of the assumptions and virtual ultimatums that surround the nuclear policy and

Pakistan's ability to field a bomb, continued ambivalence breeds misgivings and uncertainties. Sooner rather than later a decision is required. We must either demonstrate we have nuclear ability, or we must demonstrate we do not, will not and shall not. The decision is momentous and the responsibility unenviable.

Removing the vestiges of protective camouflage from our nuclear policy and intent could turn out to be a little like pushing a man into deep waters in the hope that he will swim. He can also drown. But there are pessimists among us who fear we will drown anyway. We need to consider what nuclear capability signifies to us, and in what relations it is effective.

Any purely philosophical consideration of the issue can only be on the side of non-proliferation. However, the same philosophic arguments would, by extension, require nuclear renunciation from those who already have the capability. Countries like ours are in no position to extract such abnegation from others.

Pakistan's responses to the question have to be framed in a surround that is nuclear. They have to be made also in an atmosphere where there is political polarisation within the country, and a power structure the divisions of which function to enhance such polarisation as well as foil executive capacity. There is much to be said in favour of seeking more propitious circumstances for a critical choice.

Indeed, it would be comfortable, and also probably expedient and discreet to evade the issue and maintain, as ever, that Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear technology is purely peaceful. The logical consequence, then, is to sign the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]. For the argument that India does not sign and is already a nuclear power carries no weight if we do not intend to catch up.

If there is wisdom in neither signing the NPT nor "going nuclear" it needs to be elucidated within the country, and made acceptable to the world that favours non-proliferation for us, and wants more than our verbal reassurances that we do too. External pressures as well as domestic political haranguing do not permit a convincing prolongation of the uncommitted stance. The issue has become live.

This tendency should not be suppressed. The benefit of the democratic principle should be seized to encourage communication and debate at the informed level that becomes public and that allows accommodation.

adjustment and reconsideration. For there is a division of opinion amongst those who can be said to know, and there is only inclination—untempered by understanding—on the part of the public.

The choice needs to be approached in a frame of mind that seeks objectively to determine what would be in the best national interest. But responses and conclusions that derive from deep-rooted convictions overcarry into the perception of the matter. Thus, sound advocates of cuts in defence expenditure with the corresponding release of funds for social development bring the same principle to bear in forming a response to the question of nuclear capability. But the question—separate from funding and personnel—is also whether we wish to acquire a nuclear dimension for our concept of defence and whether that is necessary.

Most disturbing for the Pakistani citizen is the all too strong likelihood that formal renunciation of the possibilities of our own nuclear parity or deterrent vis-a-vis India would strengthen Indian hegemonism in the region. A historical experience of the *Mahabharat* ethos cannot be set aside as Pakistani paranoia.

Indian action in Sri Lanka, the ruthlessness in Kashmir, episodes with Nepal, differences with Bangladesh all yield revealing glimpses of the mask of her "enlightenment" slipping. Pakistani preparedness to relax the defensive posture requires even more than a quid pro quo from India if it is to be a sound policy rather than a wild gamble.

There is no room for chauvinism or jingoism in making the choice as to nuclear policy, but a habitual liberal or pacific stance is as much to be guarded against and scrutinised afresh as a habitual hawkish one. The constraints of economics cannot be wished away: money does not grow on trees; nor is virtue invariably rewarded. Economic graphs that offer projections for either case must underwrite the validity of alternatives.

Self-respect is an essential in sovereignty. A renunciation of nuclear intent must not be arrived at through dictates other than the sentiments of the Pakistani people themselves. But a pursuit of nuclear goals cannot be undertaken without a full exploration of all that this entails or could engender for the country.

Until the people, the experts in science and defence, and the politicians at the helm in Treasury and Opposition confer, no reasoned conclusion is possible. We cannot make up our minds or recommend a course without a clear, authoritative understanding of what is at stake, and unsupported by public sentiment any choice will be found lacking.

U.S. Seeks To Halt South Asia Nuclear Arms

924P0034B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Nov 91
Union Edition p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent N. Paklin: "Who Is Harboring the Atom Bomb"]

[Text] Delhi—American diplomacy intends to prevent the transformation of densely populated South Asia into a "nuclear powder keg." The United States has decided to send Under Secretary of State R. Bartholomew to India and Pakistan.

The American position is clear: The United States will "pressure" India for the sake of nuclear disarmament. And we? We, naturally, also favor the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that was drawn up with our direct participation and signed in 1970. Like the American position, our position of principle is to have as many countries as possible subscribe to that document, which has become a serious obstacle on the path of the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. But... As always, our diplomatic principle is selective. For a long time we sharply criticized a number of countries for their refusal to subscribe to the treaty. But this is the significant thing. All those countries—South Africa, Israel, Pakistan—are states with a pro-Western orientation. Our diplomacy said not a word about India, which stubbornly refuses to sign this document. Why? We are friendly toward India. Until recently India's negative position was also passed over in silence by the Soviet press. It was considered that if we openly said that we were thinking about India's refusal to subscribe to the treaty we would thus offend our Asian ally and do "irreparable harm" to Soviet-Indian relations. Abusing the allies of the United States was another matter. We were very good at that.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the United States has not employed a dual approach to this important issue. It has spoken the truth without constraint to its own strategic partner in Asia—Pakistan—which, like India, has for many years been working on an extensive nuclear program reliably hidden from the eyes of the world community. Things have come to a pass such that in October of last year the President of the United States, after receiving no convincing proof that Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons, issued instructions to halt economic and military aid. It is thought that this decision has prompted Islamabad to demonstrate its own enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament and put forward a new plan to transform South Asia into a nuclear-free zone. In the summer of this year the president of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, proposed the convening of an international conference to be attended by Pakistan, India, the United States, the USSR, and China to discuss "nuclear weapons in the region in a spirit of equality and in an unbiased way."

The main factor in the Pakistani plan is for Pakistan and India to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty simultaneously. We recall that the treaty signatories have

assumed an obligation not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. However, the treaty does not prohibit work on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. And in order to ensure that there would be no doubts about compliance with the conditions of the treaty, the countries signing it agree to open the doors of their nuclear laboratories and research centers to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Right from the start India has assumed a sharply negative position with respect to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Governments and ruling parties in the country have changed but the attitude toward this document remains the same. This was confirmed by the country's new head of state, Narasimha Rao. He recently assured the deputies of the Indian parliament that like previous ones, his government "does not intend to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." The opinion of the overwhelming majority of the world's countries that have signed the treaty notwithstanding, India is suggesting that it is "discriminatory in nature" because it does not guarantee a balance between the interests of nuclear and nonnuclear powers. Deciphering this somewhat vague formulation, Indian External Affairs Minister M. Solanki has noted that "the treaty legitimizes the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers."

In fact it came about historically that during the early years the five powers that are the permanent members of the UN Security Council each separately developed its own nuclear weapons. In a certain sense of the word they are monopolists. But surely it would not be better, would it, to break that monopoly and allow nuclear weapons to proliferate throughout the world, permitting them at the same time to fall into the hands of political adventurers? There are grounds for suggesting that India does not think in this way. In that case, only one explanation remains for its negative attitude toward the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, namely, its intention to develop its own nuclear weapons. "You have nuclear weapons, and we want them." This was told to me with passion by one eminent Indian journalist. However, the possibility cannot be excluded that India already possesses nuclear weapons or is ready to assemble the components of them. As long ago as May 1974 India produced a nuclear explosion in the desert. The government announced that it was a test for peaceful purposes. However, Indian newspapers published on the day after the explosion informed the world, not without pride, that India "has successfully exploded its own atom bomb, and has joined the 'nuclear club' as the sixth member."

Many political figures in India are openly calling for the development of an "Indian atom bomb." They explain their demand by the fact that Pakistan, so they say, already has nuclear weapons. Referring to "reliable intelligence sources" they even state the number of nuclear bombs that Pakistan has detonated—from six to 10. Pakistan is offering assurances that its nuclear program is a peaceful one, but India, it says, does possess atom bombs. It is difficult to say how reliable any of this

information is. But one thing is striking, namely, that on the pages of serious Indian journals, retired generals are already describing scenarios for future Indian-Pakistani clashes using nuclear weapons. Some American senators also do not exclude this possibility. An ominous outlook, to say the least.

The transition of the two leading powers—the Soviet Union and the United States—from a nuclear arms race to reductions in nuclear weapons has created favorable conditions for new peace initiatives. The decision by France and China, which possess nuclear weapons, to subscribe to the treaty is of exceptional importance.

Pakistan's proposal to convene a conference of the five states for the purpose of transforming South Asia into a nuclear-free zone was met with a favorable response in Moscow and Washington. Then China supported the initiative. In an interview with the Pakistani information agency in late October, PRC Chairman Yang Shangkun stated this: "We believe that the proposal on a regional solution to the problem of nuclear proliferation is of great importance for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia and for maintaining peace and stability in this region." But what of India, without whose participation the conference cannot be convened?

For a long time India kept its silence. It has just been broken. The Indian representative in the political committee of the United Nations voted against Pakistan's proposal, whose co-sponsor was Bangladesh, to declare South Asia a nuclear-free zone. The governments of the diminutive island state of Mauritius and the equally tiny mountain kingdom of Bhutan voted with India against the proposal. The representatives of 104 countries supported the resolution. The voting clearly demonstrated that India's negative position is not met with understanding by the overwhelming majority of the world's countries. And among the Indian public...

"India should assume a more construction position than heretofore with respect to the proposal by Nawaz Sharif made to the United States, the USSR, and China that they should join India and Pakistan to address together the problem of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia," writes the TIMES OF INDIA.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for India to reject what is being called the threshold of a "regional approach" to the banning of nuclear weapons. But its calls to resolve the nuclear problem once and for all on a universal scale is perceived in the world as a utopia. Therefore, in Delhi they are working on intermediate scenarios so that, without closing the door on itself to acquire nuclear weapons it can save face in the eyes of the world community. One such scenario it is proposing is to agree to the conclusion of a treaty with Pakistan on non-first-use of nuclear weapons. Of course, this kind of agreement would be significant, but it does not eliminate the possibility of the emergence of nuclear weapons in both India and Pakistan. But by returning to a nuclear arms race the two countries are risking a heating up of

their traditional tense relations and transforming the South Asian subcontinent into a "nuclear powder keg," not to mention the financial and economic burdens that a nuclear race will ineluctably entail.

Agreement Signed on Thermonuclear Reactor

LD1511031191 Moscow TASS in English 1706 GMT
14 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Lyubov Dunayeva]

[Text] Moscow November 14 TASS—An agreement on designing an international thermonuclear reactor was initiated in Moscow today.

The point at issue is the establishment of a transnational corporation with the participation of scientists from Europe, the Soviet Union, the United States and Japan who will work on its design for the next six years.

The construction of the reactor will tentatively take another seven years.

Successful testing of the reactor will pave the way for conducting an international experiment involving thermonuclear fusion.

Use of thermonuclear fusion will lead to developing an ecologically pure and safe source of energy.

Gorbachev Said To Control Nuclear Arms

AU0412104491 Hamburg BILD in German
4 Dec 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Nikolay Portugalov, adviser to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, by Karl-Ludwig Guensche; place and date not given: "Gorbachev Will Continue To Control Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] [Guensche] Does Gorbachev still wield power in the state?

[Portugalov] Of course, he does.

[Guensche] Who controls the nuclear weapons?

[Portugalov] The USSR president, of course. I assume that Boris Yeltsin, being the Russian president, shares nuclear responsibility. However, being the Union's supreme commander, Gorbachev continues to control the nuclear weapons.

[Guensche] Haven't developments passed by Gorbachev's dream of a new Union?

[Portugalov] The Union is not a dream but a clear political goal. I do not think that developments have passed this goal. The referendum on independence of the Ukraine by no means spells a total break with the Union. We will have to wait and see what the State Council will decide. In addition, reactions abroad are important.

[Guensche] Can the Ukraine survive on its own?

[Portugalov] That is a prize question. Probably it can. However, to survive does not mean to become a prosperous state. There might be serious difficulties in this respect.

[Guensche] What will become of your old comrade-in-arms, Erich Honecker?

[Portugalov] Yeltsin has recognized that this question cannot be solved without Gorbachev. In any case, he suggested letting Honecker go to Chile, but this did not suit your government. It was in fact illegal to bring him here from Germany. But now that he is here, certain moral factors and former alliance obligations take on a certain importance. My suggestion—let us put mercy before the law.

Yeltsin Comments on Nuclear Weapons

AU21N113991 Hamburg ARD Television Network
in German 2055 GMT 20 Nov 91

[Interview with President Boris Yeltsin by ARD coordinator Martin Schulze, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG correspondent Horst Bacia, and ARD correspondent Gerd Ruge in Moscow on the "Im Brennpunkt" program; date not given—recorded; Yeltsin speaks in Russian with simultaneous German translation]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Ruge] Let me ask you a question about the relationship between Russia and the other republics, and between the republics and the Union respectively. A Union treaty has been agreed upon by the leaders of the republics. However, there are voices in the Uzbek Republic that the Uzbek Republic will not sign the treaty in its present form. In addition, it is still uncertain whether the Ukraine will sign it. What kind of relations does Russia want with the Union? Can it make its economic policy dependent on economic developments in Kyrgyzia or the Uzbek Republic, for example?

[Yeltsin] First, we do not have a Union treaty, only an economic treaty on the economic union of the states. It is no political treaty. A political treaty is under discussion. Negotiations will continue on 25 November. The meeting will be attended by the leaders of the sovereign states, including the Uzbek Republic. Mr. Garimov did not participate in the most recent session because he was sick. For this reason, I can say that there will be a union. Unfortunately, however, only eight or at most nine states will join it. We will establish economic links. We primarily base our hopes on bilateral relations that we have concluded with several republics that want to form a union. We will conclude bilateral economic agreements for the year 1992 by 15 December.

[Schulze] Mr. Yeltsin, one thing is scary in this connection—the question of who controls the nuclear weapons in the territories of the different republics. Can you give us a reassuring answer? I have even heard that there are people who fear that nuclear weapons might be used

against Russia by certain regions, by certain republics. Can you dispel these fears? Are control mechanisms either intact or will they be developed in a way that the dangers can be ruled out?

[Yeltsin] As far as your question as to whether other republics or Russia might use nuclear weapons is concerned—this is not a serious question. This is technically impossible. One center is responsible for the administration today. There is the president of the country, and there is the defense minister. Without these two officials, no button can be pressed. It is impossible. In addition, the president of the country must speak with us before he makes a decision. We have telephone contact, and we can reach each other very quickly to agree on a joint decision—in the three nuclear republics Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine, for example. With the consent of the republics, the president and the defense minister make the final decision. Fears are unfounded today that nuclear weapons might get out of control. I have familiarized myself carefully with the situation, and I know that very well.

[Bacia] You once mentioned a right of veto in this connection. Do you still insist on this right of veto? What you have just described is a collective agreement on the use of nuclear weapons.

[Yeltsin] What right of veto?

[Bacia] Relatively shortly after the coup you stated that Russia should be given a right of veto concerning the use of nuclear weapons, which means that it would be possible to forbid the use of nuclear arms if Russia does not agree.

[Yeltsin] I understand. First, our aim is that Russia should become a nuclear-free world power. This is a strategic task and a prospect for the future. Second, because we have this crisis phone and because of the fact that the president of the Russian Federation can oppose the use of nuclear weapons, the president of the USSR will not order the use of nuclear arms. [passage omitted]

NATO Crindler on Nuclear Arms

PM2911164191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 28 Nov 91 p 3

[Report by S. Ivanov: "Where Does the Threat to Peace Come From? 'Not From NATO, at Any Rate,' Members of the North Atlantic Bloc's Political Committee Delegation Assure"]

[Text] "Your country's nuclear military arsenal is under control," NATO Deputy Secretary General John Crindler tried to persuade journalists. Then I asked him to clarify whether, during the four days of its first visit to Moscow, the NATO Political Committee delegation had managed to discover who precisely controls nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. J. Crindler stated that the aim of the visit was to establish military and political contacts.

NATO representatives are hardly alone in desiring to see a single state on the territory of the USSR; similar statements have also been heard from Western politicians and economists. In this case, however, NATO's representatives were concerned exclusively with military problems, in particular the fate of the agreements on strategic offensive weapons and conventional weapons, which were signed by the USSR president way back and are still to be ratified. NATO is seriously contemplating the possibility of the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons through the territories of the new sovereign states. It is no accident that the Declaration on the Soviet Union, adopted at the meeting in Rome, noted that the peoples of the former USSR are entitled to determine their own future, proceeding from the principles of guarantees of human rights and freedoms, democratization of the economy, and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

NATO once again sees a possibility of controlling these processes by extending contacts with the center and the former republics. It would appear that, with this aim in mind, our Minister of External Relations E. Shevardnadze will for the first time take part in the conference of NATO foreign ministers 20 December.

Control of 'Nuclear Briefcases' Detailed

*LD2311210891 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1747 GMT 23 Nov 91*

[*"Military News: Missiles and Strategic Aircraft are Under Control by General Kobets"*—POSTFACTUM headline]

[Text] [no dateline as received]—According to unofficial sources, close to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, General Kobets controls only the second stage of use of strategic nuclear weapons but not what is called nuclear briefcase (a number of first basic commands for direct use of nuclear weapons). Till the August events, the nuclear strategic arms were under full control of the USSR president, the minister of defense and the general staff chief General Kobets, responsible for Russia's defense, assumed control over the commands after the August events. Over 80 percent of the USSR strategic weapons are located in the RSFSR territory. At present, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov has no access to the nuclear briefcase.

Consequently, 2 of the 3 nuclear briefcases are under control of the USSR president and the USSR General Staff chief.

Alekseyev's Comments on Nuclear Weapons Noted

*LD3011052591 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 2136 GMT 29 Nov 91*

[Sergey Tkachuk report, from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Sergey Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Constitutional Compliance Committee, held a news conference today on succession as it applies to the Nonproliferation Treaty on nuclear weapons and the powers of state security bodies. Answering journalists' questions, Alekseyev noted that the Union of Sovereign States will be the direct successor from the point of view of the law. If the newly formed states claiming nuclear weapons do not confirm their participation in the treaty, this will be an international act of disagreement with universally held norms of law.

In accordance with conclusions on the powers of militia and state security bodies linked with the limitation of rights of citizens, those provisions which have placed citizens' rights under serious threat lose force or should be reviewed. Regarding questions on infringements of the Constitution, Alekseyev noted that a nomenklatura privatization is occurring, in essence, changing nothing.

Commander Comments on Control of Nuclear Weapons

*LD2411162191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 0100 GMT 24 Nov 91*

[Commentary by station military observer Commander Aleksandr Yakovlev—read by announcer]

[Text] Western mass media regularly reports about the Soviet nuclear weapons supposedly divided by the Soviet sovereign republics. Our military observer, Commander Aleksandr Yakovlev, has this to say:

I believe such supposition may take place but only as a variant for the worst development of the situation. Indeed the main thing is not to allow dividing nuclear weapons among the republics. So far there are no grounds to speak about their really going from under a single control. First, it is worth remembering the decision of the Soviet State Council session held on 14 November, where the leaders of most republics took part. The session confirmed the intention to preserve the system of collective security with the single Armed Forces remaining intact, and the nuclear weapons, too.

The fact that the nuclear weapons are deployed on the territory of this or that republic does not ensure it the right to possess these weapons. These were created by All-Union republics. The nuclear weapons in the country are a component part of the single system, involving the missile attack warning systems, the control over the outer space, and anti-missile defense. Like the missiles, these components are situated in different republics but can be nationalized. Besides, neither republic is able to bear the burden of possessing nuclear weapons by itself. This involves the production and keeping in combat readiness of delivery means and nuclear warheads.

Supposedly the nuclear weapons could be taken by force but I am sure the attempt would be curbed thanks to the strict control and additional measures to be taken following the State Council session. This is the view of the

Soviet Defense Ministry, voiced by General Valeriy Mamelov, chief of the ministry's Information Department. He says our stand is invariably firm; we are in favor of not only the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we are for the effective mechanism ensuring their non-proliferation.

The presidential decree about strategic deterrence force will undoubtedly ensure the political stability despite the political ambitions of the leaders of sovereign states. This force should involve all Soviet strategic weapons. As to the shorter-range nuclear missiles, the Soviet Union and the United States have decided to unilaterally scrap most parts of the arsenal.

Official on Halting Nuclear Technology Transfer

*OW0112064091 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2026 GMT 29 Nov 91*

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" (DP) feature, transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] DP [Diplomatic Panorama] has been informed that, in the course of the Soviet-United States consultations on problems of strategic stability held in Washington on November 20-21, the American side expressed concern over the possible consequences of the emigration of nuclear physicists and people who have worked in the military sphere from the USSR. The danger involved in the leakage of nuclear technologies from the USSR was also emphasised by members of a delegation from the NATO Political Committee that has just left Moscow.

The head of the Department for International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights of the USSR Foreign Ministry, Yuriy Reshetov, told our correspondent that he thought it was impossible to stop the leakage of scientific information. International law rules out any restrictions except those on the export of purely military secrets.

In his opinion, any national bans could give rise to a "fresh wave of violations of law and human rights".

"If you have some kind of formula in your head which some country or other may use for military purposes, the best way to stop it is to introduce international sanctions against that country," Mr Reshetov believes. Those introduced against Iraq were a good example of this.

Union Breakup Raises Nonproliferation Issue

*PM0212105591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Nov 91 Union Edition p 6*

[Vitaliy Kobyshev "Political Observer's Viewpoint" commentary: "Soviet Threat? Yes, But Now Without Quotation Marks"]

[Text] A slight warming has begun in the international situation. Expressions soothing to the ear have come into

use—"the end of the cold war," "the disarmament race," "together toward a lasting peace," and so on.

These are not empty slogans. They are all true, but only partly true. In the opinion of specialists, the "disarmament race" concerns obsolete types of weapons, and the latest, "smart" weapons are not being cut; on the contrary, development of them is being stepped up. So, without doubting the readiness and desire primarily of our country—now a Union of Sovereign States—and the United States to move toward a lasting peace, you cannot help wondering: Is the military threat actually receding and can we finally relax a bit and get down to more urgent and expedient matters?

The last thing I would want to do is to alarm my fellow countrymen as they battle against all kinds of difficulties which have now become unbearable. But at the same time it is impermissible for illusions, which, as is well known, give rise to deep disillusionment or else break people's hearts, to lead to a great and irretrievable calamity.

Thirty years ago John Kennedy predicted that by 1970, 10 countries and by 1975 possibly 15-20 countries would have the potential to produce nuclear weapons. He was probably exaggerating somewhat, but specialists would probably prefer to state that the exaggeration was slight.

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in 1968, has undoubtedly not only played its own beneficial role but continues to play it today. But the truth is that it has not been an insurmountable obstacle to states desperate to possess lethal weapons. For many of them it is not so much a technological as a political and financial problem. This is not an invention on my part. In this world everything or nearly everything is bought and sold. And, despite the desperate efforts, primarily of our country and the United States to check the process of the spread of nuclear weapons, some people have, without great publicity, sold uranium and other components as well as delivery vehicles, while others have bought them lock, stock, and barrel.

Now about the most dangerous thing, if not the most tragic.

The recent exchange of "courtesies" between Russian and Ukrainian officials—utterly staggering in its unexpected absurdity—about the possibility of delivering nuclear strikes against each other, irrespective of the question of who was the first to say "but" and whether this "but" was uttered at all seriously, has given rise to at least three exceptionally important new problems.

First. It has become clear that, although the lion's share of nuclear weapons and delivery systems is located on RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] territory, another three republics among the Union members should now be regarded as nuclear states. "A nuclear potential, 20 percent of which is concentrated in the Ukraine is, apart from everything else, also a great asset and possession for a sovereign state. I would be in no hurry to give it up. But we

will see later what to do with it." Ukrainian presidential contender I. Lukyanenko states

Second. Insufficiently clear and often simply contradictory official statements are prompting many people to ask a legitimate question. In the former Soviet Union is there a reliable mechanism for control over these weapons of mass destruction? In other words, does a single person invested with supreme authority continue to have his finger on the most sinister button?

Let us be frank. Top Soviet leaders' assurances that nothing has changed in this context and therefore there is nothing to fear do not convince everybody. "USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev has lost control of nuclear weapons," the German newspaper BILD AM SONNTAG claims. In an interview with that newspaper (CDU) defense expert Bernd Wilz, referring to his recent conversations in Moscow, stated that presently in the USSR control by the center over nuclear weapons is possible only on the basis of consultations with the republics' leaderships. Hans Stercken (CDU), chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Commission, believes that these republics are trying to use the nuclear weapons in their territory as a means of exerting pressure, and also to demonstrate their independence and sovereignty.

You might suppose that Germany's attitude to this problem was especially sensitive. But it emerges that no, Germany is not alone in this. "Leading military and political strategists share the fear of instability in a disintegrating state that has a complement of 27,000 nuclear weapons.... The uncertainty arising should the Soviet Union disintegrate is at least one of the reasons why Britain and France have decided to continue to modernize their nuclear submarines and tactical nuclear weapons. Working out scenarios for action in connection with the new uncertainty is a task that NATO is getting down to solving," ABC Television explains. "The fact that Boris Yeltsin has a black attache case with him day and night is evidence that there are now two fingers on the Soviet nuclear button." London's THE INDEPENDENT reports in turn. The attache case, which a serviceman carries for him, contains nuclear codes, as does Mikhail Gorbachev's similar attache case. Whether both leaders retain the same degree of control over the Soviet nuclear arsenal remains unclear." And although the Russian president's apparatus denied the INDEPENDENT report, this information flashed around the world. Some people believed the denial and some did not.

Third. The new situation in our country has aroused just as much fear regarding tactical nuclear weapons and so-called "conventional" weapons, some types of which approach nuclear weapons in their killing power. To what extent is this arsenal controlled? Isn't there a danger that both irresponsible, ambitious governments and terrorists, the mafia, and so on will gain access to it? Many people both here and abroad are concerned, not without reason, that what is being introduced on the former USSR's territory is a market mentality which is

extremely simple as far as some people are concerned. If everything can be traded and the main thing is profit, then why make money out of weapons?

A very serious situation is developing. I realized just how serious after talking with a man to whom until quite recently you could not gain access.

For 10 years Vladimir Ivanovich Sementsov headed the USSR Ministry of the Economy and Forecasting Export Control Department. A former department. A former ministry. But he himself is far from washed-up, but is a specialist acting with his former energy and possessing unique experience and knowledge. For 10 years the subdivision he headed conscientiously and extremely efficiently saw to it that no raw materials, equipment, or technology needed for creating nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction left the country. "We worked according to a plan and methodology that enabled us to exercise complete control," Vladimir Ivanovich says. "The work went quite smoothly because we knew that nobody except the Ministry of Foreign Trade had the right to export these products. Now that all enterprises have received the right to carry out export-import transactions, the question has arisen of how to organize control to ensure that new technologies associated with the production of weapons of mass destruction do not become the subject of thoughtless, unprincipled trade."

For my part I will note in passing that in the countries which we now customarily call civilized, tough and sometimes draconian state control has been established over such deals. When it is violated (for instance, the recent disclosures concerning deliveries from Germany to Saddam Husayn of components needed to create nuclear weapons), it becomes a subject for judicial investigation.

This April the USSR president issued a decree approving a system of control over the export of raw materials, equipment, and technology used in the creation of weapons, and also of products for peaceful purposes which could be utilized to create nuclear, missile, chemical, and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

It was a necessary and timely decree. The problem with it, as with many other necessary decrees, is that essentially it has remained on paper. For various reasons. Including the fact that there is nobody to implement it. After the August putsch all control structures vanished into oblivion. Now something like a commission for state export control is being recreated.

Now for the most important thing. If you bear in mind that, not to mince words, a civil war is going on in a number of regions of the former Soviet Union, the problem of "nonproliferation" is just as important for us from the domestic viewpoint as it is in the international context, or even more important. And we are not the only ones gripped by fear. I get no pleasure from saying this, but we now look much more dangerous to the international community than, say, Saddam Husayn.

However, the comparison is more emotional than factual. But the crux of the matter is that the processes taking place in our country threaten the peace and security of all mankind. This is when every reason emerged to talk of a Soviet threat. It is rather terrifying that people abroad see this more precisely and clearly than some of our local Bonapartes, who have been blinded by the power they have usurped and their largely illusory television fame.

Of course, it is easier to note all this than to answer the \$64,000 question: What is to be done?

I will not pronounce on things which require a collective answer, moreover an answer that takes into account all features of a rapidly changing life. Regarding the Soviet Union (alias the Union of Sovereign States), it tried to avert the looming tragedy. Unfortunately, much of what had been done was nullified by the aforementioned events that have developed in various regions of the country. You might say: People are losing heart. We have no right to say that, because it is a matter of life and death for both present and future generations.

People have not lost heart. Much is being done. Let us start with the fact that, on the initiative of around two dozen different Soviet organizations united around and inspired by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (now the USSR Ministry of External Relations), an association in support of the nonproliferation of various types of weapons, chiefly weapons of mass destruction, has just been set up. A conference-symposium at which preference was given not to incantations but to specific proposals was recently held in Moscow.

Here are some of them.

To bring to the attention of deputies of the USSR and republic Supreme Soviets a fact which is unusual at first glance but an actual fact nonetheless: The problem with the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction has now come to the very forefront of international affairs.

To discuss the consequences ensuing from this during consideration and ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

To propose the start of special hearings in foreign affairs commissions and in other commissions involved in these problems.

On the basis of the Chernobyl experience, to raise the question of the strictest control over nuclear materials.

To tighten export-import controls concerning these materials and also finished products and technology. In this connection to elaborate precise legislation, which we completely lack at the moment. For example, in England publication of the articles of this legislation required a 500-page volume.

On the basis that the International Atomic Energy Agency is concerned with narrower technical problems,

to study the idea of setting up a Nonproliferation Committee under the UN Security Council

Possibly to agree on holding appropriate international inspections on the ex-USSR's territory

Many other proposals were made. If approved, all of them could become an addition to the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Mankind once again faces a critical challenge. When I think how on earth to cope with the challenge, which threatens everybody equally, I recall the maxim formulated by wise ancient Roman lawyers: "Nobody should profit by another's foolishness."

Nuclear 'Brain Drain' Possibility Arouses Fears

PM271160191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 27 Nov 91 p 1

[Interview with Professor V.N. Mikhaylov, leader of the Soviet military nuclear program, by A. Khokhlov; place and date not given: "Will Brains Leave?"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] This is front-page news in practically all the world's newspapers: The world community is concerned that the military-industrial complex is disintegrating in connection with the collapse of the USSR. What will happen if our nuclear scientists start working in North Korea, Iraq, or Pakistan—countries which are "an arm's length" away from creating nuclear weapons? Professor V.N. Mikhaylov, leader of the Soviet military nuclear program, answers this question.

[Mikhaylov] I have always said that human heads are the dearest thing in the world. If our country permits a "brain" drain abroad, military-strategic parity in the world will be upset and it will be impossible to speak of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons around the planet—which is the chief problem today.

[Khokhlov] How great is the likelihood that our nuclear scientists will seek to leave the motherland?

[Mikhaylov] So far not one of the serious scientists, of the people who possess important information, the creators of nuclear weapon technologies, has left the country. I can responsibly declare that my colleagues are patriots and none of them wants to go abroad and work on creating weapons for anyone, but how is it possible to live now on 400 rubles a month? This is the average wage of a person working to create nuclear ammunition.

The uncertainty is people's biggest worry. Our government and society just cannot decide whether we need nuclear weapons. Moratoriums are announced and nuclear test sites are closed down, but there are no decisions defining the future fate of scientific establishments working for defense. Whatever happens in the future, it must not be forgotten that without scientific cadres the country will not build a "bright" future. Even if we destroy our nuclear ammunition, we cannot

manage without people who are capable of developing modern economical and ecologically clean technologies.

The question of funding for the country's nuclear weapons complex in 1992 has not yet been resolved. Will it be? At the same time we are losing scientists, engineers, and highly skilled workers. Whereas cadre "turn-over" in our sector used to be 2 percent a year, in 1991 it is 20-30 percent. It is, as a rule, the best who leave—they go to commercial structures which pay five or six times more.

[Khokhlov] Are there any regime restrictions on travel abroad for defense scientists?

[Mikhaylov] They have always existed. People have usually abided by this principle: Specialists versed in nuclear technologies have been "held back" and been asked or sometimes even made to stay in the USSR for a while, until science has taken a step forward. This usually took between five and 10 years. But now, under conditions of democracy, when the regime structures have noticeably updated their approach to control over the military-industrial complex, the possibility of a nuclear scientist leaving the USSR is becoming perfectly real. An atomic scientist enjoys favorable odds—many countries are prepared to grant him citizenship.

[Khokhlov] Consequently, it will very soon be possible to forget about the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons?

[Mikhaylov] What is a person to do if he only knows how to make atom bombs—and nothing more—when he feels unwanted in his own country?

Threat of CW Use in Gulf War Pondered

924P00344 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Nov 91
Union Edition p 4

[Article by M. Zubko: "Why Did Iraq Not Use Chemical Weapons?"]

[Text] Stockholm—For the millions of people throughout the world who tensely followed the combat operations in the Persian Gulf zone, the question "Why did Baghdad not use chemical weapons?" has remained unanswered. For the fear was very great that it would!

Finally there is an answer: The fact is that not only Iraq had a major chemical weapons capacity but they were also available to the multinational armed forces in the anti-Iraq coalition. Saddam Husayn was well aware of that! And it was this that restrained him from unleashing a chemical war.

This sensational news was revealed to Swedish journalists by reserve Major Juhan Persson, who was attached to a Swedish field hospital during the fighting.

Juhan Persson said that he was playing the role of communications officer and therefore had constant contact with the armed forces of the various countries in the

coalition. In particular, the major had access to the allies' top command organ—the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff.

According to Juhan Persson, that committee contained a special section that was in charge both of making preparations to repel strikes made with chemical, nuclear, and bacteriological weapons, and also the possible use of those same weapons by the allies. And the Swedish major also had contacts with this committee.

The major was unable to reveal that he had himself seen the chemical weapons stores, and was unable to say whether they were held in storage facilities or deployed with the fire forces. But he was aware of instructions on the use of these weapons, a document running to about 200 pages. The instructions set forth in detail how ground or air force units should use them.

"I held those instructions in my hands," the communications officer claimed. "It was a real document, not some kind of paper invention. Chemical weapons were to be used if necessary as a response to chemical attack by Iraq."

The command of the multinational armed forces believed, according to Juhan Persson, that it had a greater stock of toxic agents than did Baghdad.

The allied forces command, however, had suggested that it had few such weapons at its disposal. It was important that Saddam Husayn and his generals knew that the multinational forces also had a large arsenal in the zone of combat actions. Using various channels, U.S. and British intelligence made sure that this information got to Baghdad. Juhan Persson recalled this.

"Stay calm," they told me. "Saddam Husayn knows our capability..."

The Swedish journalists raised this question: So how was it that the powerful press of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the other states following what was going on in the zone of combat actions against Iraq and around it did not learn about this? Juhan Persson says that this was because of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, which had laid a "smoke screen" in front of the journalists by making active use of "skillful propaganda officers."

"Correspondents asked the major this: Do you not think that you have acted wrongly in revealing this, for Sweden also took part in the actions of the coalition (by sending a field hospital—author's note)?

"I do not believe that it was unusual that the multinational coalition forces would have chemical weapons at their disposal," the Swedish officer responded.

Another report on the same subject has been published in the Berlin newspaper TAGEZEITUNG. On the eve of the combat actions the American command ordered medical injections to provide immunity against the

effects of chemical and biological toxic agents for all those who would be involved in operations in the Persian Gulf.

The generals remained silent on just one thing, namely, that the vaccine had at that time not yet been through the stage of the necessary laboratory tests.

Concern Over Soviet Missiles at Nuclear Plant

OW2611192291 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1443 GMT 26 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In a telegram to Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the vice prime minister of Lithuania expressed his concern regarding the Soviet anti-aircraft missiles located at the Ignalinskiy atomic energy station. The division of Soviet missiles is supposed to be relocated shortly. "Lithuanian leaders do not accept this, it raises a certain danger for the atomic energy station," the message says.

The Lithuanian vice prime minister suggests to Shaposhnikov that talks start shortly on this issue.

Government Plans To Have Nuclear Sufficiency

OW0312162291 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1514 GMT 3 Dec 91

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian leadership plans to have a nuclear potential within the range of "optimum or minimal reasonable sufficiency," said Mr. Gely Batenin, RSFSR deputy foreign minister, in an exclusive interview with DP [Diplomatic Panorama] on December 3. He and the representatives of the other sovereign ex-Soviet nuclear republics—the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Byelarus [Belorussia]—were members of the Soviet delegation at Washington talks to reduce strategic and tactical weapons. The talks were led by Soviet deputy foreign minister Aleksey Obukhov.

All the republics including the Ukraine spoke at the talks in favour of preserving a common nuclear strategic space, said Mr. Batenin. They also emphasized the importance of centralized control of nuclear weapons. According to them, a common centre will be required to control the nuclear weapons. However, none of the republics strongly supported the idea of common armed forces.

Mr. Batenin does not believe that in the future the ex-Soviet sovereign states will conduct nuclear disarmament talks on their own. An understanding was reached that a common negotiating mechanism is required, as well as a common position—a necessity in view of the geostrategic space the Soviet republics share.

Finland To Assist St Petersburg Nuclear Plant

LD0512021591 Moscow TASS in English 1304 GMT
4 Dec 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Dodonov]

[Text] Helsinki December 4 TASS—Finnish specialists have started work on the upgrading of a nuclear power plant near St. Petersburg, the Finnish Telegraph Bureau reported on Tuesday [3 December].

Research centres of Sweden, Germany, Italy, France and Britain are also involved in the project to improve the safety and design of the reactor used at the plant. Finnish specialists will analyse fire safety at the station and will plan and, possibly, perform the necessary operations to enhance its fire safety.

Commentator on Possible ROK Nuclear-Free Zone

SK2111050491 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1100 GMT 19 Nov 91

[By station commentator Alekseyev from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] On 20 November U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney will meet with ROK Defense Minister Yi Chong-ku in Seoul to discuss security.

Station commentator Alekseyev writes:

According to SEOUL SINMUN and CHOSON ILBO, the immediate agenda has been finalized.

Seoul is expected to raise the question of arming the (?army units numbering 39,000) with ultramodern U.S. war equipment, like Patriot antimissile missiles and Tomahawk missiles.

As has been reported by CHOSON ILBO, the ROK will also try to get (?approval) from Washington on its plan to establish [word indistinct] for its own missile system with a range of 180 km. The upcoming U.S.-ROK negotiation, however, is not expected to come out this way.

The question stems from the fact that U.S. and ROK defense ministers are expected to discuss the procedures of withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons from the ROK. In addition, Seoul believes that the nuclear weapons will be removed as soon as possible, according to the ROK defense minister.

Judging from all the facts, the ROK will be turned into a nuclear-free zone in the near future. Thus, important measures will be taken to achieve Pyongyang's long-standing plan for denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. However, this will take more than a guarantee from Seoul.

The international community expresses sincere concern about Pyongyang's refusal to open its nuclear facilities to

international inspection. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Pyongyang has signed requires that the signatory place its nuclear facilities under international inspection.

An exaggerated rumor that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons is being spread. Once U.S. nuclear weapons begin to be removed from the ROK, Pyongyang will be in a strong position, because U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in the ROK have given Pyongyang an excuse to refuse any international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Uranium Confiscated From Iraq Arrives in Moscow

LD2611235891 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2100 GMT 26 Nov 91

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Excerpt] UN experts have discovered a new store of enriched uranium at an Iraqi enterprise. The possibility that they will find an atomic bomb that is almost ready is not being ruled out. Experts believe that the search needs to be continued without relying on any further assurances from the Iraqi leadership.

Incidentally, we have already reported that the Soviet Union gave its consent to store on its territory uranium confiscated in Iraq. A few days ago, 11 containers with 78 rods of enriched uranium were delivered to Sheremetyevo Airport in two special flights.

[Correspondent A. Pasyak] Only the MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper reported the secret cargo from Iraq.

[Begin S. Yermakov recording, not further identified] The recipient country or the supplying country does not have the right to disclose the whereabouts and the route of transportation of highly enriched uranium if the quantity exceeds a certain amount. This right was observed by the Soviet side. [end recording]

[Pasyak] According to Resolution 687 of the UN Security Council, all materials that have been or could still be components of Iraq's nuclear or chemical missile potential are subject to destruction, confiscation, or being rendered harmless. But according to Resolution 707, Iraq relinquishes all rights to nuclear fuel. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Foreign Ministry Denies Uranium Supplies to Iraq

LD2911182191 Moscow TASS in English 1618 GMT 29 Nov 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Nikishov and Aleksey Tabachnikov]

[Text] Moscow November 29 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vitaliy Churkin refuted press reports "alleging that the Soviet Union could be a source

of uranium-235 for Iraq". Speaking at a briefing in Moscow today he emphasised that "the Soviet Union does not manufacture that type of uranium".

Information that traces of uranium-235 with 93 per cent enrichment were discovered in Iraq was reported by the seventh U.N. inspection mission in that country. Considering that the type of uranium can be used to manufacture weapons, the Soviet side thinks "it is highly important to investigate this fact with the aim of establishing the source from which this uranium got into Iraq," Churkin said.

'Special Service' To Handle Arms Sales

LD0312120191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0900 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] The Russian Federation is to set up a special service for selling arms to third countries. The service will consist of officials of the republic's Government Committee for Conversion, the Defense Ministry, and a department which is being created at the Russian Foreign Ministry to consider the political aspects of arms exports. The Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said a few days ago that control over Soviet arms supplies is an area where Russia is assuming responsibility. It's reported by sources close to the White House of the Russian Federation that next year the Russian Government expects to earn between 15 and 20 billion dollars from arms sales.

Chechen President on Existence of Nuclear Arms

OW2511172691 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1506 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President Dzhakhar Dudayev of the Chechen Republic, formerly commander of an Air Force division stationed in the Estonian town of Tartu, has told a BF [BALTFAX] correspondent that there were no nuclear weapons deployed in the town when he was serving there. Gen. Dudayev left Tartu after he had been elected chairman of the Chechen People's Congress about a year ago.

The Estonian newspaper RAHVA HAAL has published an article by a deputy to the Estonian parliament, Juri Lum, in which he claims that there are bomber aircraft carrying nuclear weapons stationed at the Air Force base in Tartu.

Gen. Dudayev expressed the hope that "the Estonian Government will be able to maintain control of the nuclear weapons if there are any in the republic."

Kazakhstan President Comments on Nuclear Arms**Nuclear Control Discussed***OW2511222691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2032 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev has reiterated that control over nuclear forces must be exercised by all members of the new Union. Mr. Nazarbayev has made such a statement in response to reports about his intention to pull nuclear armaments over to the Islamic world."

The statement, circulated by the press service of the Kazakhstan president, also says that only dilettantes could speak about the possibility of moving nuclear weapons to Russia. "Each launching system encompasses an underground complex," the statement says. "To move it to another place is just impossible. In the most modest estimate, such a project might cost from 25 to 30 billion roubles."

Mr. Nazarbayev said that the nuclear testing ground in Semipalatinsk would be turned into a research centre which will serve the interests of science and economy. No more nuclear tests will be run on it, however. Since 1949 about 500 nuclear tests have been carried out in Kazakhstan. Until the 1960s nuclear tests had been run in the open. "The Kazakh people have gone through hundreds of tragedies similar to that in Hiroshima," said Mr. Nazarbayev. "Therefore the closure of the testing ground is the implementation of the people's will."

Nazarbayev Reaffirms View on Nuclear Forces*FM2711162391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Nov 91 p 1*

[PRAVDA-TASS report under the general heading "Newsbeat"]

[Text] Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev has reaffirmed his view that nuclear forces should be under the control of all members of the new Union. N. Nazarbayev was forced to make this statement by press reports of his "desire to draw nuclear weapons into the Islamic world."

1,000 Nuclear Warheads Remain in Kazakhstan*LD2811133191 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1300 GMT 28 Nov 91*

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev has stated there are more than 1,000 nuclear warheads on the territory of Kazakhstan. In his words, the warheads should remain where they are. At the same time, Nazarbayev has noted that Kazakhstan is not claiming a

nuclear monopoly and supports the idea of the united Armed Forces and united centralized control over nuclear weapons.

Possible 'Nuclear Exchange' With Ukraine Viewed*924P00394 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 2-9 Nov 91 p 9*

[Article by Stepan Kieselyov: "Press Ministry Is Angry: 'An Advocate of War and National Strife' Speaks Out"—for item mentioned in first sentence, see Soviet Union DAILY REPORT for 31 Oct 91 p 62]

[Text] Background. MOSCOW NEWS No. 42 published my article which read: "MN's [MOSKOVSKIY NOVOSTI] reliable source says that a possibility of a nuclear exchange between the independent Ukraine and Russia was discussed in the wings of the Russian government."

The publication caused acrimonious reaction from both Russian and Ukrainian politicians. "An absurdity," "canard," "vicious nonsense," "a provocation"—such words were used by the men who are by their status obliged to think rather than condemn.

"You would do well to read fewer newspapers. You would certainly feel better," the President of the USSR is reported to have said to the Ukraine's First Vice-Premier Konstantin Masik, although the President's own experience must have taught him otherwise: he had to pay with his Crimean imprisonment for ignoring press analyses and forecasts.

For politicians, the most practical attitude to newspaper publications would be to think, not to get mad.

Warning. When it's hard to think straight, one tends to have a temper tantrum. The Russian Federation Ministry of the Press and Mass Media, interpreting my article and a later publication in the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA as propaganda of war and national strife, issued an official warning. It was the ministry's first repressive act against newspapers, a first step to restrict freedom of the press and restore censorship. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA which published the notorious "Appeal to the People" as an ideological prologue to the August coup, had been spared the ministry's wrath.

It is quite natural for officials to want to bridle the press, but it is up to the court of justice and investigators to ascertain the presence of corpus delicti in a newspaper article. Also, our publication was essentially a consequence, whose cause lay in actual politics. Whether the Press Ministry likes it or not, the political reality is as follows: the two Slav Republics are falling apart thanks to politicians, not newspaper reporters. Former allies, the Ukraine and Russia have become mere neighbours and adjusted their policies accordingly.

Problem. It is common knowledge in foreign policy that neighbouring states are rivals and potential enemies. Most of my compatriots feel it intuitively to be true, because according to the public opinion poll published in the same issue (No. 42), 60 per cent of respondents saw major armed conflicts between former Soviet Republics as possible. Such pessimism must stem from the fact that, following the collapse of the Union, Republics have automatically become competitors on the world market, their competition burdened with a history of mutual grievances and hurts. In such a context, soldiers can no longer be expected to confine themselves to agricultural work alone.

Strategy. No one has ever said that former Union Republics really intend to use their armed forces for warfare. There is a world of difference between a readiness for action, and an actual intent. In a recent TV interview Gennady Burbulis, the Russian Federation Secretary of State, showed the difference graphically. "Russian has no intention of introducing customs stations to her borders," he said. "But she is prepared to do so at any moment." It is a statesman's duty to be prepared for any turn of events, and to have a plan of action for any contingency. As long as a state has an army armed with nuclear weapons, one has to be a simpleton to believe that their government has no plan of action for their use.

Therefore, the Russian Federation Press Ministry has done the Russian government a disservice by issuing a warning to the press. Unless the government of a nuclear power has a well-thought-out nuclear strategy for all possible contingencies, it can be considered negligent.

Solution. The only alternative to an armed conflict between former allies is an economic union. The pact signed recently by the leaders of the Republics has to do with more than the economy. It has to do with security. My article that angered the Press Ministry so, was prompted by my concern for security, not war propaganda.

Removal of Nuclear Arms to Russia Feared

OW0112110191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1400 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Stepan Davymuka, first vice-chairman of the Lvov Regional Executive Committee, recently warned against the danger of nuclear weapons, currently located in the Ukraine, being concentrated in Russia.

Mr. Davymuka also alleged that he had information about the Union Defence Ministry's plans to remove tactical nuclear weapons from the Lvov region in the near future.

Ukrainian President Speaks on Nuclear Weapons

LD0212221591 Moscow Radio Rossi Network
in Russian 2006 GMT 2 Dec 91

["Information and Analysis" feature by correspondent Leonid Milyarskiy from Kiev]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Leonid Kravchuk considers that it is not expedient to hold new elections to the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet now, in conditions of economic chaos. In any event they can be held only after the adoption of a new constitution for the republic and a new electoral law.

As for nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, the Ukrainian president favors the complete destruction of them on the territory of Ukraine after talks with all interested states. Until that time, the four nuclear republics—the Ukraine, Russia, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan—in his view, should form a collective body that would take under its control [kontrol] all the nuclear weapons on the territory of the former USSR.

Republic To Convert Rocket Production Facility

LD0312055491 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1841 GMT 2 Dec 91

["Military News" feature]

[Text] The Ukraine Government and Defense Ministry are going to convert the Dnepropetrovsk research and production association "Yuzhnoye" which currently makes rocket and space devices for the production of trolley buses and airbuses AN-218.

The reason for that lies in the fact of the stopped financing from the budget of the Yuzhnoye Association by the former USSR General Machine-Building Ministry. The Yuzhnoye Association was the largest maker of the rocket and space devices, but it turned out that the deep-shaft based RS-20 rockets which were produced by the association are not suitable for delivery to the regions of their positioning for the purposes of the military duty, whereas production of Zenith rocket-carrier became profit-losing because the Ukraine does not have a space rocket starting lot of its own.

NATO Official on Ukraine Nuclear Issue

Suggests Dismantling Weapons

LD0312225691 Moscow TASS in English 2217 GMT
3 Dec 91

[by TASS correspondent Dmitriy Polunin]

[Text] Rome December 3 TASS—The NATO member states hope the tactical nuclear weapons located on the Ukrainian territory will be dismantled and liquidated in keeping with the Soviet-American agreements. John Galvin, the supreme allied commander Europe said today during his stay in Italy.

"President Mikhail Gorbachev earlier stated the Soviet tactical nuclear munitions would be destroyed. We hope it will be done," the general reminded. According to the information available in NATO, the Ukraine is ready to do likewise, Galvin stressed. He emphasised the importance of observing the agreements on liquidation of tactical nuclear weapons reached by the Soviet Union and the United States.

Treaty Adherence Urged

LD0412103291 Moscow TASS in English 1004 GMT 4 Dec 91

[by TASS correspondent Valeriy Shashkov]

[Text] Brussels December 4 TASS—NATO countries have urged the Ukraine to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, says a statement issued by NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner after a special meeting of the permanent representatives of the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance here on Tuesday.

The NATO representatives considered the situation that had taken shape after the majority of the republic's population had voted for its independence. NATO countries believe that the Ukraine should settle its future relations with the central government and other republics through peaceful negotiations, the statement points out.

The Ukraine should abide by all disarmament and arms limitation treaties that the Soviet Union had signed, as well as other international treaties concerning the observance of human rights and the inviolability of borders in Europe, the statement added.

The meeting "re-emphasised the essential need to ensure the safe, responsible and reliable control of nuclear weapons under a single authority," Woerner stated.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister on Nuclear Issue

Favors Nuclear-Free State

LD0312235391 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2100 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Zlenko made a statement stressing that the Ukraine upholds the external commitments of the former Union and is ready to pay its part of the external debt, but only after receiving its due share of

the assets of the USSR. The Ukraine will independently build its own armed forces and intends to become a nuclear-free state.

Zlenko said: The Ukraine does not have, and does not wish to have, control over the nuclear weapons on its territory. We favor a joint command of the Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. However, we shall not allow nuclear weapons to be moved and taken outside our territory. The Ukraine will abide by the pact on human rights, cares for national minorities, and champions their equality of rights.

Three Nonnuclear Principles

LD0312203591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1930 GMT 3 Dec 91

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksey Petrunya]

[Excerpt] Kiev, 3 Dec (TASS)—The Ukraine upholds all treaties and agreements with foreign countries that have been reached up to the present moment, as well as all USSR treaties that are not at variance with its Constitution, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko told a news conference today.

Speaking about the tasks and directions of his ministry's activities following the 1 December Ukrainian independence referendum, Anatoliy Zlenko emphasized: The Ukraine seeks to be a nuclear-free state abiding by the three nonnuclear principles; namely, not to accept, produce, or acquire nuclear weapons. He noted, however, that it would be expedient to set up in today's transitional period a joint command for nuclear forces made up of representatives from the republics on the territory of which there are nuclear weapons. The Ukraine intends to participate in all talks on reducing nuclear weapons, the minister stressed. [passage omitted]

Republic To Invite Nuclear Power Experts

OW0312224091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukraine will invite foreign experts to participate in analyzing whether or not the nuclear power plants located on their territory should continue to operate. The chairman of the parliamentary commission on issues relating to the Chernobyl disaster, Vladimir Yavorivsky, announced this at a press conference in Kiev. In his opinion, this problem has arisen since all of the nuclear power plants on Ukrainian territory were built by the central atomic department, and are not up to contemporary operation standards.

AUSTRIA

Connection With Iraqi 'Super Gun' Reported

AU2111152591 Vienna WOCHENPRESSE in German
21 Nov 91 p 54

[By Hannes Reichmann]

[Text] The gun barrel of the monster is over 300 meters long. With caliber sizes of between 350 mm and 1 meter, the projectiles can be 7.5 meters long—and can be fitted with nuclear warheads or shells with chemical warfare agents. The breathtaking range of the "doomsday gun" is nearly 1,500 km.

Saddam Husayn's best-guarded secret was discovered in an apparently playful manner two weeks ago. At the beginning, the game of questions and answers in Baghdad was as useless as so many others. When the UN team of 20 inspectors asked what countries were involved in the technology transfer for the legendary "super gun" constructed by the Canadian Gerald V. Bull, they received a surprisingly open answer: "Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Austria."

However, the successful mission of the "special commission" from New York led to a new mystery, because the UN inspectors have persistently refused to reveal details concerning the suppliers of the spectacular Iraqi "super gun." "We tried to gain access to the material," Herbert Wulf, a member of the renowned Stockholm peace research institute SPIRI and a member of the "UN Disarmament Department," reported, "but without success so far."

Lieutenant Colonel Norbert Fuerstenhofer, commander of the seven-member Austrian team of UN inspectors, added: "We help trace Iraqi chemical weapons. Even if my partners know about details of the super gun, they are not allowed to disclose them to me because they are officials in charge of secrets."

Despite all the secrecy, traces of the infernal machine leading to Austria have been discovered. The key figure is Canadian-born Gerald V. Bull. He experimented with large-caliber super guns on the orders of Canada and the United States as early as the sixties. Later he changed from a scientist into an unscrupulous mercenary in the field of technology. In 1979 he sold the license for a 155-mm gun with a range of 40 km that he had developed at the same time to the Linz-based Voest company and the South African weapons concern Armscor.

As is known, during the Iran-Iraq war, the Voest GHN-45 gun reached both sides of the front through illegal channels, which caused the largest scandal of the Second Republic. In the meantime, Bull devoted his attention again to his pet project: The so-called HARP project ("High Altitude Research Project"). This time he worked for Saddam Husayn. However, two shots

through the base of the skull fired by professional assassins killed him outside his apartment in Brussels on 22 March last year, even before the deal was uncovered. The most likely motive was that the Israeli secret service, Mosad, got wind of the development of the Iraqi super gun and wanted to get rid of Bull—who also maintained business relations with Israel.

A few weeks after the killing, British customs authorities confiscated eight giant gun barrels—a shipment by English firms to Iraq. Only a few days later, investigators stopped more gun parts in Turkey, Italy, and Greece.

One trace leads directly to Austria. In his book "The Paris Guns and Project HARP," published in 1988, in which Bull provides detailed information on the state of development of the giant gun, he showered a certain Harald Cranz with words of thanks: "We must add our deepest appreciation to Dr. Harald Cranz of Vienna who helped throughout the entire project in gathering reference material, in translations, in coordinating, and in valuable discussions," Bull wrote about his close personal friend.

Cranz and Bull got to know and respect each other 20 years ago. "Cranz was introduced to me as Dr. Bull's right-hand man in Brussels in 1979," a former Voest engineer recalled. "After the conclusion of license negotiations on the GHN-45 gun he worked nearly one year as an employee of the newly-founded Voest Defense Technology company. He possessed a Mercedes 500, which our directors were not able to afford at the time."

Cranz' advantages, as described by several of his colleagues, were outstanding knowledge in the sphere of defense technology, and excellent contacts with politicians and the leadership of the Austrian Army.

Harald Cranz' political connections stem from a well-known discussion circle. On the occasion of the 16th anniversary of the founding of the "Club 45," one of its founders, Vienna businessman Udo Proksch, issued a message in 1989 with the following text: "The Club 45 is still alive—despite what happened." The statement was signed by, among others, Club President Karlheinz Demel, the lawyer Heinz Damian, the section head in the Austrian Army, Franz Sailer, and Harald Cranz.

The gentleman with the beard, who is in his late forties today, still maintains close relations with the Army. A few weeks after the murder of Gerald Bull, Cranz was appointed manager of the "Deugra Brandschutzsysteme GmbH" [Deugra Fire Protection Systems Inc.] in Vienna. According to the commercial register, Deugra is the subsidiary company of a certain PHG Holding GmbH in Ratingen in Germany. The Deugra company sells very special fire protection systems: "We are dealing with protection against explosions," an employee of the German parent company explained. Tanks of the Austrian Army are also equipped with Deugra systems designed to prevent explosions, the Vienna Office for Defense Technology confirmed.

Harald Craz declines to comment on all that—on his deals with Deugra and on his involvement in Bull's Iraqi gun project. Attempts to conduct a clarifying interview with Craz ended with the following poor result: "Go away or I will call the police."

GERMANY

Yeltsin Stresses Unified Nuclear Command

LD221111891 Hamburg DPA in German 1031 GMT
22 Nov 91

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin has countered fears about the future of the Soviet nuclear arms potential in the disintegrating Union. The nuclear weapons will have to remain under a unified command structure in the future, too, Yeltsin stated today to the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee in Bonn. The loss of a unified command is not permissible. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin met Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher for breakfast this morning. The talks concentrated above all on questions of the economic development in Russia and the trade links between Russia and the new federal laender. Yesterday, in a joint declaration, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Yeltsin agreed on close cooperation, with regular consultations. [passage omitted]

Siemens Said Involved in Iraqi Bomb Effort

AU2511134691 Vienna PROFIL in German
25 Nov 91 p 65

[Alan George report: "Nuclear Factory From Germany"]

[Text] London—The subsidiary of the Siemens concern, Interatom, which was transformed into a department of the parent company last year, admits to having concluded a contract with the state-owned Iraqi company al-Faw Establishment in 1989. The Germans undertook to build a plant for the production of steel and aluminum pipes in Iraq. The location was indicated as Jusufiyah [place name as received], 20 km south of Baghdad.

According to the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), which is investigating Saddam Husayn's program for weapons of mass destruction on behalf of the United Nations, Siemens' pipe factory was in reality part of Baghdad's al-Furat Project. There, centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium were to be manufactured with the Siemens machines. The enriched uranium would have been the basis for the construction of an atomic bomb.

The Siemens spokesman does not believe in the nuclear program. "It would not have been possible for the Iraqi buyers to deceive a company with such a high technological standard as Interatom."

Thus, did Siemens not build what the IAEA claims? Plans that have appeared now seem to prove that the IAEA and Siemens are talking about the same plant.

The construction of the al-Furat project was not completed when the Gulf war started in January this year. It consists of four main buildings, which were code-named B00, B01, B02, and B03 on Iraqi documents. Building B01 (which was renamed T1250 at the end of 1989 by the Iraqis) was intended to house the centrifuges and to serve as a workshop for trial runs of the centrifuges during the initial phase. Subsequently, 100 centrifuges were to be arranged in cascade. The start-up was planned for 1993.

Siemens claims that the B01 building cannot be the building belonging to its project. "Our building was not part of a four-element complex," a company spokesman stressed. "It was an isolated building with a fence around it." Siemens even provided a sketch of the layout of the plant.

If one compares the IAEA plan of the al-Furat project with the Siemens sketch, one realizes that the Iraqi building code-named B01 and the Siemens building T1250 are identical. The IAEA inspectors found evidence in the Iraqi files that this installation was part of a centrifuge plant for the enrichment of uranium. The deal that was originally approved by Bonn was again canceled in 1990. Interatom was officially warned that the Iraqi partner Industry Project Society was involved in an operation aimed at purchasing sensitive military technology. As a result, Interatom stopped its supplies for the T1250 building and canceled a training program of 24 Iraqis working for the Industry Project Society. As early as in November 1989, one of the Interatom instructors refused to participate in the training program. The reason he gave was that German nuclear secrets might be disclosed in this way. Siemens insists that no important machines were supplied.

Apart from the enrichment of uranium with centrifuges, Iraq used a second method, electromagnetic isotope separation (Emis). The IAEA inspectors discovered that part of the Emis equipment was supplied by Siemens as well. The company denies having deliberately participated in the Emis program. A company spokesman stated that the sales to Iraq were coordinated by the Siemens representation in Baghdad, Samhiri Brothers. The Germans allegedly had no influence on the use of the equipment they delivered.

Stoltenberg Planned More Arms Exports to Israel

AU2511161091 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
25 Nov 91 pp 16-17

[Unattributed report: "Stoltenberg's Recommendation"]

[Text] Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg originally wanted to supply far more war materiel of the former National People's Army (NVA) to Israel than became

known in the course of the tank affair. This is shown by a confidential protocol on the session of the Federal Security Council on 27 February 1991. Referring to "item four on the agenda (h)" on the delivery of "military equipment and ammunition" from NVA stocks, it is stated: Minister Stoltenberg "proposes that it be approved since the Israeli wishes are within the scope of what we promised to them." According to the note in the protocol, Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Economics Minister Juergen Moelleman rejected this. Among other things, minelayers and other equipment were to be delivered. Then it is recorded as Chancellor Helmut Kohl's "summary" that "item four on the agenda (h) will [be] postponed by mutual agreement." This sounded completely different in the Defense Committee in early November: Stoltenberg affirmed that he sticks to a statement of his Parliamentary State Secretary Will Wimmer, who had reported in the Bundestag in late October that the Federal Security Council "rejected any delivery of tanks and ammunition to Israel because of Minister Stoltenberg's recommendation." According to the minister's assistants, in Stoltenberg's report to the Security Council such a rejection only referred to one Israeli wish: the delivery of heavy battle tanks of the Soviet type T-72.

Ministry Refuses Comment on Arms-to-Israel Story

LD301145291 Hamburg DPA in German 1354 GMT
30 Nov 91

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Defense Ministry today refused comment on a report by the newspaper BILD AM SONNTAG, according to which the Bundeswehr supplied weapons to Israel from stocks of the former GDR's "National People's Army" [NVA]. A ministry spokesman said that a relevant report to the Defense Committee was being completed. The Defense Ministry does not want to preempt that report. BILD AM SONNTAG reports in its latest edition, quoting the secret report, that the Bundeswehr smuggled NVA weapons abroad in over one hundred shipments, mostly to Israel. The Israelis flew to Alhorn near Osnabrueck with their own Hercules transport planes and loaded up there by the ton—from shipborne missiles to tanks. Jerusalem simply needed to present lists of requests to Brigadier Georg Bautzmann to receive the desired armaments. According to the newspaper, Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) will give a detailed report next week to leading members of the Bundestag Defense Committee.

BND's Porzner Warns of ABC Proliferation

LD0112141591 Hamburg DPA in German 1242 GMT
1 Dec 91

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—According to the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), some Middle Eastern countries will have nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons [ABC], as well as the necessary missiles, in about ten

years if they continue to acquire armaments. In an interview with DIE WELT (Monday edition), BND Chief Konrad Porzner named, above all, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The main supplier of arms and technical know-how is the DPRK.

Iraq has been set back because of the war, but remains dangerous. "Iraq has probably become a source of know-how on ABC weapons and missiles," Porzner said. "If Iraq is not strictly controlled it will re-achieve its former technological standard within about two years." Iran is keeping its options for a uranium or plutonium bomb open. "By 2000, Iran will be able to build nuclear weapons." According to Porzner, Syria is in the process of improving its capabilities in the field of missiles. With DPRK help, it is building facilities for the production of Scuds. Syria is also doing research on ABC weapons and already has poison gas factories.

Greenpeace Expert Cited on Wismut Uranium

92GE0088B Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German
8 Nov 91 p 3

[Interview with Inge Lindemann, Greenpeace member and Wismut expert by DIE TAGESZEITUNG; place and date not given: "Wismut Intends To Market the Yellow Cake Accumulated During Reorganization and Cleanup"]

[Text] [DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Mrs. Lindemann, the Wismut management claims that no uranium has been mined since 1 January 1991. Is that true?

[Lindemann] That is a matter of interpretation. Up until 31 December 1990, ore was cut from the still operating Wismut shafts in three shifts around the clock. The justification was that the ore had to be broken and hauled out of the mine. Needless to say, the haulage was not completed by 31 December 1991, and is still underway. In my opinion, this constitutes uranium mining. Moreover, in Koenigstein the ore is not only being hauled out of the mountain, but, via another technical procedure known as leaching, it is being filtered out in liquid form and transported to the conversion plant in Seelingstaedt.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Wismut claims that the uranium must be mined in order to complete the necessary cleanup. Does continued prospecting constitute cleanup?

[Lindemann] Wismut interprets "cleanup" as everything it is now doing: hauling uranium ore out of the mine, removing waste heaps, and dumping radioactive waste into repositories. They are transporting everything they can to the conversion plant in Seelingstaedt. According to Wismut, conversion continues to yield 20-30 tons of uranium oxide annually, and leaching at Koenigstein in Saxony yields 150 to 200 tons annually.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] What is done with the uranium?

[Lindemann] The uranium is hauled out of the mountain and transported in the form of ore to the Seelingstaedt uranium conversion plant. There it is pulverized and reprocessed into uranium oxide, also known as "yellow cake" [preceding term published in English], because that is what it resembles. This "yellow cake" is packed in barrels, which are stored in large quantities in the countryside surrounding Seelingstaedt. Operation of the Seelingstaedt plant has not been authorized under nuclear regulations, nor does the plant have the facilities to store large quantities of uranium oxide. Nonetheless, 900 tons of uranium oxide are presently being stored there.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] In order to market the uranium oxide, Wismut signed an agency contract with the firm Interuran.

[Lindemann] That is correct. Wismut wants to market the uranium oxide that accumulates during cleanup operations. What this actually means is that, because the Trust Agency still owns the mines, the operations currently being carried out by Wismut in the name of "cleanup" are being financed by taxes. This is unlikely to change in the near future, as cleanup will cost millions. There is speculation that those in charge intend to produce uranium oxide in order to make a profit from the excavated material, waste heaps, and abandoned radioactive and chemically polluted areas of the Saxon and Thuringian uranium mines. Nothing has been said about closing the Seelingstaedt conversion plant. A month ago, uranium production was reduced, but it will be continued at an ore throughput rate of 200,000 tons per year. This means that uranium oxide will continue to be produced and "toted up" by Interuran.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] And who buys it?

[Lindemann] It is sold all over the world, and is used in atomic power stations as well as in the nuclear weapons industry. But Wismut and Interuran are waiting to sell the uranium oxide until they can make a better profit from it. The price on the world market is currently very low.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Wismut is using geology to justify its continued mining operations: The tunnels must be emptied of all ore before they are flooded. Otherwise, the groundwater will be contaminated.

[Lindemann] At this time I can neither confirm nor deny that. We have contradicting information, which we are still examining. Flooding is very problematic. Between Gera and Aue in the Erzgebirge is a large old geological fault zone, the center of which is beneath the Drosen mine near Ronneburg. Two main groundwater guidance arteries intersect here. Furthermore, this area is subject to more earthquakes than anywhere else in the new laender. Basically, Wismut wants to get the problem off its back as soon as possible, so everything is passed off as cleanup. They would like it to be as inexpensive as

possible and at least somewhat beneficial. Consequently, they would like to use atomic waste to produce valuable, marketable substances.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] So on the one hand they are being paid to do the cleanup, on the other hand they are making a profit from it?

[Lindemann] Yes, you could say that. But there are some areas that can no longer be cleaned up. The word "cleanup" implies that everything will be fine again.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Recently the Bundestag passed a law, according to which Wismut will have full control of its land.

[Lindemann] In essence, this law gives Wismut the freedom to once more become fully active in uranium mining and to continue the full-scale processing of uranium and production of uranium oxide.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Do you consider that possible or profitable?

[Lindemann] As early as a year and a half ago, the EC stated that the accessible mines still contained 66,000 tons of extractable uranium ore. Furthermore, there is an additional 55,000 tons yet to be tapped. Thus, the remaining stock of what was once the largest uranium mining region of Europe is still in the ground. An ex-Wismut employee expressed it this way: Two years worth of world output production should still be in the ground of the former GDR. And given that the Federal Government might well welcome possible access to strategic reserves, it is entirely conceivable that it will keep its options open. Nonetheless, I do not believe that it is possible for the Wismut mines to once again become a major source of uranium.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] But the yield would make it worth while?

[Lindemann] Not necessarily, because uranium is not so valuable that it would continue to be profitable to mine it. The problem lies elsewhere. Even in conjunction with other enterprises, Wismut would not be able to regain its preeminence in the uranium mining industry.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Why not?

[Lindemann] For one thing, the business lacks political acceptance. Second, the consequences of the uranium mining in that area are too obvious.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] That brings us back to cleanup.

[Lindemann] A year ago, Environment Minister Toepfer announced that he would turn the Wismut mining region once more into a green meadow. That is hardly likely. So far, neither the Federal Government nor Wismut has recognized the complexity of the task.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Do you think that Wismut is planning to turn the area into a repository for atomic waste?

[Lindemann] There has been talk of that. I hope that everyone has rid themselves of the idea. But I do believe that Wismut plans to reprocess more than just its own atomic waste into uranium oxide.

Wismut Continues Uranium Mining, Marketing

92GE0088A Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German
8 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by Barbara Geier and Baerbel Petersen: "Radiantly Beaming Business for Wismut AG—Continuing To Mine Uranium Ore"]

[Text] Despite its supposed discontinuation of mining operations, the eastern German uranium mining firm, Wismut AG, is still producing and marketing uranium ore. Officially, mining operations ceased as of 1 January 1991. In fact, however, the former Soviet-German firm, now the property of the German government, has mined approximately 77 tons of uranium ore concentrate since 11 March 1991 and delivered it to the French marketing firm Interuran. A Berlin film crew, which produced a documentary for German Television (DFF), had this information confirmed by the international nuclear energy authority, Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community). Interuran, which is headquartered in Saarbruecken, is a subsidiary of the French energy concern, Cogema, and the energy supply firms, Badenwerk and EVS, both of which are active in the uranium market.

The uranium is being mined under the guise of the "Cleanup Plan," for which the Federal Ministry for the Environment has earmarked 830 million German marks [DM] in subsidies for 1991 alone. Recently, Toepfer's ministry appears to have developed some reservations as to whether this money is actually being spent on environmental protection. Increasing distrust of Wismut has prompted Bonn to commission its own cleanup report. Over the past 40 years, Wismut, formerly one of the largest producers of uranium in the world, has been the source of severe environmental damage in Thuringia and Saxony. The total cleanup cost has been estimated at approximately DM15 billion.

Cleanup Also Constitutes Uranium Mining

Activities which have been passed off as mere "cleanup" clearly include not only measures to reclaim radioactive soil, but, most importantly, the continued mining of uranium. According to Wismut and the Ministry of Economics in Bonn, this is dictated "by environmental and mining technology." A statement by Wismut which, misleadingly, is written in the grammatical past tense, declares: "Based on geomechanical analyses, in order to

restrict the damage, it was necessary to conduct additional limited mining operations." The statement continues: "To avoid harmful geological stress, the southern portion must continue to be mined at least until the end of 1992."

Given that Wismut AG has an agency contract with Interuran which does not expire until 1994, it is likely that mining operations will continue at least until then. Furthermore, the contract contains an extension option. Yesterday, a spokesman from the Federal Ministry for Economics admitted to DIE TAGESZEITUNG that the "remaining uranium is being extracted and commercially exploited."

However, it is not only via Interuran that Cogema receives a share of the profits generated by the continued mining of uranium. On 18 January 1991, Wismut, Interuran, and Cogema Uran Services coestablished the "Gesellschaft fuer Dekontaminierung, Sanierung, Rekultivierung mbH" [Decontamination, Cleanup, Reclamation Firm mbH] (DSR), supposedly also headquartered in Saarbruecken, for the "planning and implementation of environmental protection work and the cleanup of mines"(!) Both the Federal Ministry for Economics and Runge, spokesman for Wismut, claim to have no further details on the work to be carried out by the new establishment.

DSR itself, which is not yet incorporated, does not have an office. According to an Interuran representative, however, the firm plans to establish an office in Gera "as soon as possible." As far as incorporation is concerned, the spokesman says that this will be delayed until the prospective corporation has been examined to ensure that it is not in violation of antitrust law. In response to inquiries by DIE TAGESZEITUNG, however, a spokesman of the Federal Antitrust Office stated that the examination had already been completed, and that, with regard to DSR, there were no problems.

The same reason (lack of notification by the Federal Antitrust Office) has been given for the delay in the formal establishment of a second "cleanup corporation," which Wismut wants to cofound with Steag, the electrical power behemoth from Essen. According to information obtained by DIE TAGESZEITUNG, this examination was also completed some time ago, and the conclusion was "no problem." Weber, a spokesman from Steag, states that there is to date only a joint venture agreement, which is to concentrate "primarily" on the cleanup of the Crossen processing plant. He was unable to say when or if this "joint venture agreement" will become a proper corporation.

Two months ago, on the basis of a 3,000-page cleanup plan submitted by Wismut, the Federal Ministry for Economics commissioned a report by the "Uranerzbergbau Wesseling" [Wesseling Uranium Ore Mining] firm on the projected cleanup. Wesseling is the second largest

uranium mining firm in the Federal Republic of Germany, and is partially financed by the Federal Government. Wesseling experts had developed a procedure for extracting uranium oxide from radioactive scrap metal from the Hanau fuel element. Due to excessive contamination, however, the procedure was rejected. There is some concern that this same procedure will resurface in the report commissioned on the Wismut cleanup. The Wesseling report was submitted to the Ministry for Economics yesterday.

Recovery of Nuclear Deposits?

In the meantime, the statements made in the aforementioned DFF program of 5 November by Daniel Comte, Cogema marketing representative, are extremely interesting. With regard to the interest of his concern in Wismut, Daniel Comte stated before the camera: "Cogema has several objectives in eastern Germany. These include the recovery, in conjunction with Interuran, of the Wismut nuclear deposits in the new laender. In order to have a hand in this recovery, Cogema, Interuran, and Wismut have established their own firm."

Since the decision to close their reprocessing plant in The Hague, the French have been frantically seeking alternatives. Are we to allow them to foist their atomic waste off on the supposedly closed Wismut processing plants in Seelingsstaedt and Crossen?

UNITED KINGDOM

Soviet To Be Quizzed on Missiles During Visit

LD2911214391 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1855 GMT 29 Nov 91

[By Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION defence correspondent]

[Text] General Vladimir Lobov will become the first Soviet officer to see Britain's nuclear deterrent at first hand when he climbs aboard a Polaris submarine next week.

The Soviet chief of general staff will be given an unprecedented tour of a Polaris submarine at the Faslane base on the Clyde on Wednesday [4 December].

Polaris operations have been traditionally shrouded in secrecy, although in recent years there have been occasional visits by accredited defense correspondents and other specialist groups. A Polaris is on patrol at any one time hidden and unseen under the sea with its 16 ballistic nuclear missiles targeted on Soviet sites.

The general will also be given a tour of the development work under way for the new Trident submarines which will replace Polaris in the mid-1990s.

Gen Lobov begins a week-long visit to Britain on Monday when he can expect to be closely quizzed over control of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. There is

widespread alarm at the danger of nuclear weapons in non-Russian republics falling into the hands of rebel forces. Significant numbers of nuclear weapons are believed to be still based in the Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan. The West fears that the republics may seek to use them as bargaining chips against the new Russian dominance. Some of the nuclear weapons are still pointed at Britain and the United States and, without central control, there is the fear they could be fired by rogue units.

Files Concerning Arms Sales to Iraq Destroyed

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[By Toby Helm, Christy Campbell, and Christopher Elliott]

[Text] Highly sensitive records of British arms and chemicals sales to Iraq have been destroyed by government officials, thwarting a Commons investigation into trade links with Saddam Husayn.

On the eve of a parliamentary inquiry into the "Super-gun" affair and other arms exports to Iraq, the Department of Trade and Industry [DTI] has revealed that it is unable to provide full records of exports.

The admission last night enraged MPs [member's of parliament] and provoked suspicions among select committee members of interference by government intelligence officers.

A memorandum from the Department of Trade and Industry to the committee admits that files detailing export dealings before February 1988 are not available—"since HM [Her Majesty's] Customs and Excise microfilm records are not retained permanently; records are only available from February 1988."

The government has also admitted that documentation is missing for more than 40 tons of sodium sulphide, a potential base for chemical weapons, exported by a UK company in January 1988.

The admissions come as backbench MPs prepare for the opening session of the trade and industry committee's inquiry into Britain's trade links with Iraq.

Last night both Labour and Conservative MPs on the committee expressed disbelief that the records had been destroyed.

Jim Cousins, Labour MP for Newcastle Central, said: "This is a deeply worrying and unsatisfactory situation. Our duty is to find out what was exported and by whom. Now we find there are no records because there isn't the space to keep them."

"The credibility of the government is totally undermined. There will have to be explanations either from the DTI or Customs as to how this was allowed to happen."

Another committee member, Barry Porter, Conservative MP for Wirral South, said: "It appears very strange indeed that these records do not exist." The Conservative chairman of the committee, Mr. Kenneth Warren, said he did not want to prejudge evidence: "I will make my judgment when I have heard all the evidence."

The Export of Goods Control Order restricting exports to Iran and Iraq came into effect in 1985. Customs officials have explained that statistics and paperwork are kept for only three years. But MPs argued that far tighter control should have been maintained given the obviously sensitive nature of exports to Iraq.

Much "non-lethal" British defence equipment reached Baghdad in the years covered by the "lost" records. A Middle East arms specialist said they included missile-test bunkers and earth-moving equipment in two deals sponsored by International Military Sales (IMS), the Ministry of Defence trading arm.

His view on the missing files was that "British intelligence must have got there first."

Industry sources point to the large quantity of weapons that are known to have reached Iraq via Jordan as a potential embarrassment for the government. The Kingdom was a big customer for British arms in the period.

The committee will question DTI officials rigorously over the methods of licensing, monitoring, and recording exports to countries subject to restrictive orders.

Since the Gulf war there has been a string of disclosures about deals in which British firms exported materials which had the potential to build Iraq's nuclear and chemical arsenal.

A Customs and Excise spokesman said yesterday: "We collate those figures on behalf of the DTI, not for our own purposes. We do not keep detailed records beyond three years as we have no reason to."

But MPs will argue that the DTI should have maintained duplicate copies of such sensitive records and that government departments should hold on to them for at least the life of a Parliament.

Since the Supergun affair broke only months before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, there have been suspicions of a government coverup of how much was known in Whitehall. On the opening day of the hearing, officials from Walter Somer, the Midlands firm that supplied parts for the Supergun, will be called to give evidence.

MPs have been mystified further to discover that a British scientist they want to question is now working for the American Government.

Dr. Christopher Cowley, 53, who played a key role in the design of the Supergun, has been traced by the committee to Thailand, said a member, where he is reported to be employed by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

He was arrested after the swoop by Customs in April 1990 on the steel tubes as they awaited shipment to Iraq as oil equipment. In November 1990 all charges against him were dropped.

The scientist claimed that he had told British intelligence all about the monster gun in September 1988 soon after it was ordered by Iraq.

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